

## **Appendix 27 -- Kissinger's Secret Talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai (1971)**

**Source:** Shirley A. Kan, "China / Taiwan: Evolution of the 'One China' Policy -- Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei", Updated December 16, 2002. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Code: RL 30341), p. 19.

(excerpts) July 9, 1971

Our military presence in Taiwan at this moment is composed of two elements, the two-thirds of it which is related to activities in other parts of Asia (the Vietnam War) and the one-third of it which is related to the defense of Taiwan. We are prepared to remove that part related to activities other than to the defense of Taiwan, that's two-thirds of our force. . . within a specified period of time after the ending of the war in Indochina. We are prepared to begin reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military questions need not be a principal obstacle between us. I may say, incidentally, that these are personal decisions of President Nixon which have not yet been discussed with our bureaucracy or with Congress, and so should be treated with great confidence.

As for the political future of Taiwan, we are not advocating a "two China's" solution or a "one China, one Taiwan" solution.

(On Zhou Enlai's question of whether the United States would support the Taiwan independence movement): We would not support this.