

Appendix 107 – False PRC Central Military Commission Document (1999)¹

Document of Office of the Central Military Commission (OCMC) OCMC Serial No. 5B19995D 65

OCMC Notice on Forwarding the Document Watching Closely for Changes in the Relationships with Taiwan and Enhancing the Awareness by Military Leadership of the Current Situation

All Regional Garrisons, All General Departments Affiliated to the Central Military Commission (CMC), All Arms and Services, All Corps Headquarters, All Provincial Garrisons, and All Prefecture Garrisons.

Attached please find the document Watching Closely for Changes in the Relationships with Taiwan and Enhancing the Awareness by Military Leadership of the Current Situation, which has been drafted by the General Political Department approved by the CMC Conference to be distributed down to the commanders at the division level. Please read carefully and implement seriously.

Office of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China August 10, 1999
(Seal of the CMC)

Attached please find the document Watching Closely for Changes in the Relationships with Taiwan and Enhancing the Awareness by Military Leadership of the Current Situation, which has been drafted by the General Political

Watching Closely for Changes in Relationships with Taiwan and Enhancing Awareness of Military Leadership of Current Situation

As soon as Li Denghui put forth the two country theory, which aimed at splitting our motherland, the ranks and files of our armed forces were filled with indignation. At all levels within our armed forces, seminars, discussions, presentations, and symposiums were held to condemn Li Deng hui's evil intention of splitting the motherland in open disregard of the national interests. The CMC has, on behalf of the armed forces, made a solemn commitment to the Party and the Country that we shall not sit idle while allowing one inch of territory to be split away from the map of our motherland, which conviction is obviously based on solid political ground given the above-mentioned militant zeal of opposing split, committed to reunification. Such a sentiment has provided a precious opportunity to promote political goals within our armed forces.

The current priority of our political work is: holding high the great banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory, unifying closely around the Party's Central Committee with Comrade Jiang Zemin as its core, implementing the Requirements adopted at the Expanded Emergency Meeting of the CMC and OCMC Notice on the Current

¹ This document's authenticity has been judged to be false, but it is included here because it has been published on the internet and influences some thinking in the United States.

Situation, further exposing and criticizing the two country theory, taking advantage of the strong determination of opposing the split and high emotions of nationalism and incorporate them into daily training, and ensuring that in carrying out the Party and the country's great strategy of reunifying the motherland, the people's army always retains firm and correct political goals, fully-charged patriotism, constant battle alert, and staunch and conquering-all operational capacity so as to make new contributions to the motherland. With this focus, high-ranking commanders in non-combat as well as combat positions should be well aware of the following issues so as to better understand the strategic decisions made by the Party's Central Committee and be well-prepared for the war in their units based on the rapidly-changing relationships with Taiwan.

1. To Fully Recognize the Subjective and Objective Factors Which Necessitate the Reunification of the Motherland

To resolve Taiwan issue and achieve reunification is a matter of uttermost importance which reflects the intentions of the three generations of leaders of our country. In view of the overall world pattern as well as rapidly-changing domestic and international situations, to achieve the reunification in the foreseeable future has become a most important task facing the Party and the country and specific measures must be taken from now on. In this regard, all members of our armed forces must deepen their understanding of the following points.

(1) Historical mission. National independence and reunification has remained the sole purpose of China's revolutionary movement throughout this century, including both the old democratic revolution led by Mr. Sun Yat-sen and the new democratic revolution led by our Party, both having attracted countless people of aspiration and integrity. The Northern Expedition and the War against Japan represented cooperation on different occasions between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party and were based on the above goal. From this perspective, the reunification which our Party and country are committed to achieve represents the ultimate aspiration and interests of the Chinese nation throughout the current century. In terms of historical mission, the cause of reunification is based on past efforts and constitutes an issue of nationalism which goes beyond political parties and beliefs and represents the interests of all the Chinese people, including the people of Taiwan.

(2) Taiwan issue has resulted from the Civil War and has never ceased to be an internal affair. The founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 symbolized the decisive victory of the revolutionary cause of the Chinese people on the Mainland. Because of the international and domestic situations at that time, Taiwan issue was temporarily shelved. However, since both sides accepted the political concept of one China, Taiwan issue was never internationalized. During the Korean War, when the Seventh Fleet moved into Taiwan, our government raised serious protests against the United States and pointed out that such a move had constituted an invasion, thereby clearly defining Taiwan issue as China's internal affair, which demonstrated a high degree of political sensitivity. After half a century's delay, the Chinese government's sovereignty over Taiwan has not changed; as a continuation of history, the substance of the Civil War has not changed, either. If military actions constitute the sole means to achieve reunification of the motherland, we must not concentrate on one point at the expense of the other.

(3) We must create a complete image of a big country. Judging by the various elements, which make up a big country, our country is certainly a big country. In the five thousand years of outstanding civilization, our country has commanded a predominant position in the whole world. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, particularly after the reform and opening to the outside world, our country has not only stood up politically, but achieved remarkable progress in economy and strength. As a result, our country was able to regain its sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao without resorting to war, which not only washed away the national humiliation since the Opium War, but also set the first example of ending the colonial rule with peaceful means in the world history. However, as long as Taiwan has not returned to the motherland, the unified image will remain incomplete, which is not only an emotional trauma for the Chinese people, but an issue involving the dignity of our country; it should not be neglected. If the fifty-year delay has been caused by historical background and various constraints, the situation to day points exactly to the opposite -- it is now possible to accomplish the great cause of reunification from whatever perspective.

(4) The damage to our country's interests and dignity. In the international political struggle, Taiwan issue has long since become a trump card by the anti-China forces and deteriorated into a malicious tumor that hinder the development of our motherland. Playing the Taiwan card and using it to contain China is a manifestation of the old cold-war thinking in the new international arena and an important means of opposing China by a handful politicians in the US Congress who cling desperately to the cold-war thinking. In terms of social system, it is expressed as anti-communist thinking; in terms of outlook, it is revealed as naked racial discrimination. In view of this situation, to resolve Taiwan issue and achieve the reunification as soon as possible not only involves our sovereignty and national dignity, but also directly relates to our country's development and important strategy in opposing world hegemonism.

(5) An obstacle to diplomatic relations. With regard to international affairs, the Taiwan issue is the biggest obstacle when it comes to implementing the principles of equality and mutual benefits. In recent years, the Taiwan authorities have been engaged in money diplomacy, capitalizing on the economic difficulties of a number of small and weak countries and using money as baits to induce and infiltrate some countries that have had long-standing relationships with our country. As a result, we had to put in some efforts to counter such moves, not only giving diplomacy a greater-than-normal political weight, but also introducing unstable elements into the conventional reciprocity in international relations to seriously interfere with normal diplomatic affairs. On the other hand, because of Taiwan issue, when it comes to territorial disputes and effective protection of the interests of overseas Chinese, we have to consider many different factors and engage in tradeoffs. Consequently, some countries refuse to behave properly; on the contrary, they use their intermittent relations with Taiwan as bargaining chips when dealing with us, seriously harming the interests and reputation of our country.

(6) Taiwan issue directly affects the solidarity of different nationalities with in our country and constitutes the most serious hidden problem that could endanger the very existence of the Chinese nation. Ever since he came to power, Li Deng-hui has devoted himself to changing the one-nation principle followed by the previous leadership of the Nationalist Party and

gradually turned Taiwan into a testing ground for splitting the motherland while colluding with the Dalai Lama and other traitors. The potential damage which could be caused by Li Deng-hui's seven-block theory in terms of instigating minority nationalities to split away from the motherland should not be underestimated. If Taiwan issue were to drag on, Taiwan would not only set an example for the handful of splittists among minority nationalities, but also become a base for splitting activities, in which case the whole nation would have to pay a heavy price. Commanders at all levels should enhance their understanding of the position adopted by the Party's Central Committee in regard to the reunification and carry out, at the same time of patriotic education, a wave of politically-oriented military exercises aimed at opposing splittism and promoting reunification so as to raise the political consciousness of all commanders and soldiers up to a level required by war.

2. Dialectical Relationship Between Taking Initiative and Timing in Resolving Taiwan Issue

The principle followed by the Party's Central Committee (PCC) towards Taiwan issue is clear, namely, to continue to seek peaceful reunification under one country, two systems. However, to prevent the splittists within Taiwan and international anti-China forces from splitting Taiwan away from the motherland, PCC has also stated that we would not give up the option of using military power. We have defined the latter in three different aspects, combining strategy and initiative.

In view of the fact that the Taiwan authorities deliberately confused the nature of the dialogue between the two sides and avoided progress in reunification, the leaders of our country have on different occasions since the beginning of this year stated the principle that Taiwan issue would not be allowed to drag on indefinitely, which reflected the basic attitude of our Party and country in regard to the time frame and brought the reunification issue from front strategy to the phase of implementation in a stable and methodical manner, greatly enhancing the morale of the Party, the armed forces, and the people. This is a concrete example that our Party and country are capable of taking initiatives in achieving reunification; it is also an important symbol that the core of the leadership of our Party and country have reached political success and maturity.

Based on the current situation, Li Deng-hui has pushed the relationships between the two sides into a dead end with his two-country theory and therefore stuck his foot across our bottom line, actually providing us with solid grounds for achieving reunification using military power. On the other hand, in citing historical evidence, depicting the current status quo, and disguising the two-country theory as an effort to seek reciprocity, Li Deng-hui and his followers also revealed their inner weakness, providing us with solid grounds as to timing. The meaning of timing is not limited to military operations, it also involves our strategic principle of seeking reunification through peaceful means. This is the main purpose of the General Political Department in distributing this document in accordance with the spirit of the CMC Conference. Commanders at all levels must come to a unified view in the following aspects.

(1) Considering long-term interests, peaceful reunification is still the best option, which not only will ensure for the moment the safety and well-being of the Taiwan people, but is a

practical solution which will be beneficial to the long-term stability of our country. First of all, because of the propaganda by the Taiwan authorities, ordinary people in Taiwan tend to have views very different from ours. If we opted for non-peaceful means, such differences will manifest themselves in various ways even after the reunification and cause instabilities. Peaceful reunification and one country, two system has reflected our Party's practical stance in the past decades and combined both possibilities. First and foremost, peace is emphasized. We must realize that in the foreseeable future peaceful reunification will be most beneficial to our country's development, prosperity, and lasting stability and is therefore a well-advised decision. Taking a glance across the world, all the contentions and wars taking place in various countries after the cold war have derived from two aspects: nationality and religion. In comparison, the role of ideology has been reduced. People on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are of the same race and share common ancestors, so there exists no social genes giving rise to animosities and hostilities based on nationality or religion. Moreover, the one country, two system principle has provided a common ground for resolving the differences in social system. In particular, we have been persistently following a policy of reform and opening to the outside world, which not only represents the interests of all nationalities on the mainland, but also reflects and incorporates the best interests of the Taiwan people in the long run. Under this overall prerequisite, the two-country theory put forward by Li Deng-hui has posed a serious challenge to peaceful reunification, totally wiping out the ground for the dialogue between both sides.

However, does this mean the end of peaceful efforts? We should wait for the PCC to make the decision.

(2) Li Deng-hui and his followers make up only a handful of people, who cannot represent the people in Taiwan in theory or in reality. Although many people in Taiwan are willing to keep the status quo, this only reflects their political short-sightedness caused by lack of understanding of the motherland's mainland and does not represent their interests and true wishes. The willful wrongdoing of Li Deng-hui has led to heightened tension between the two sides; if a war breaks out, the first victims will be the Taiwan people. In this sense, when Li Deng-hui, in an attempt to split the motherland, marketed his own illegitimate idea under the disguise of public opinion despite the risk of provoking a war, he not only openly betrayed the Chinese nation, but went against the best interests of the Taiwan people. No matter how the situation evolves in future, what awaits Li Deng-hui will be a solemn trial by the people.

However, we must realize that Li Deng-hui's days are numbered. His poor performance may serve to poison the relationships between the two sides, but will never change the fact that Taiwan is part of China. Nor will it prevent the overall trend that Taiwan will return to the arms of the motherland within a certain period of time.

Based on such facts, although the Taiwan Straits crisis resulted from Li Deng-hui's behavior has increased the possibility of a military solution, we have to consider post-Li Taiwan political situation so as to decide on the best timing and correctly evaluate the political future of Taiwan on which the means of reunification rests.

(3) Deciding on the best timing as far as foreign relations are concerned. Internationally, the

many obstacles to the resolution of Taiwan issue have been put in by the United States, while Japan has a complicated attitude towards our handling of Taiwan issue, but because of historical and geographical reasons, Japan does not have the right to comment. EU has ideas different from those of the U.S. and strategically focuses on Europe, so they do not have direct interests in Taiwan issue. In recent years, the relationships between EU and our country have been developing smoothly, and therefore it is very unlikely that EU will fight a full-scale war with us simply because of the United States. In fact, none of the U.S., Japan, and West Europe has given up the one-China position. The two-country theory by Li Deng-hui was to them a source of trouble rather than a gift. Even from the standing point of the U.S., Li Deng-hui's behavior has long since crossed the bottom line of the Sino-US dialogue on Taiwan, which will make it think twice before intervention. When deciding on the timing, we must take into account the above factors and use diplomatic leverage to minimize international resistance.

(4) The factor of deterrence. Based on strategic considerations, the CMC has decided to disclose, when appropriate, some information on strategic weaponry so that the U.S. will exercise some caution in decision-making and be aware that it would have to pay a price if it decided to intervene in a military conflict. The purpose is to prevent the U.S. from being deeply involved even if a war becomes unavoidable so that the losses on both sides of the Taiwan straits will be minimized throughout the war. The main point is deterrence, which is the test for a peaceful solution. The test is within the strategic scope of taking initiative and promoting good timing.

Based on the international situation as well as realities on both sides of the Straits, Li Deng-hui obviously misjudged the situation when he threw out the two-country theory shortly before the end of his office in an attempt to destroy the well-established exchange channels and internationalize Taiwan issue. Ostensibly, he underestimated our determination and capability; in reality, he was blackmailing with foreign forces behind him in total disregard of the safety of the Taiwan people. In substance, his behavior constituted a sharp contrast to our concern for the safety and best interests of the Taiwan people while seeking reunification. To stay well-informed, be ready to take initiative, and grasp the best opportunity within our predetermined limits represent in a nutshell our high sense of responsibility for the Chinese nation.

3. Enhancing the Awareness Within Our Armed Forces of the Increased Possibility for A Military Solution and Certainty of Winning the War Should It Break Out

The Sino-US relations are currently at a low ebb. However, in terms of mutual efforts to improve the bilateral relations, it should be pointed out that the US government is relatively more active. The U.S. believes that it has responsibilities for all the affairs in the world, but such a philosophy must find expressions in international cooperation, particularly among big countries. China is a big country and therefore the US government could never afford to neglect the existence of China in handling international affairs ever since the establishment of diplomatic relationships between the two countries. Such a trend has been strengthened after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in confrontation under the surface of detente.

However, in carrying out exchanges with the U.S., we have followed the principle of mutual benefit and equality and aimed at maintenance of regional stability, which reflects normal bilateral relations. The Chinese government has its own principles in handling domestic and international affairs and will never be at the beckon and call of another country. Because of such an attitude, when disagreements arose between the two countries, some US politicians would nail China down to the position of the former Soviet Union through exaggeration and turn China into a potential opponent of the U. S. Pointing fingers at China based on the US social system and human rights standards is but an excuse, and the substance is to implement the hegemonism which would never prevail. In containing China, the U.S. has only one tangible means, which is Taiwan issue.

In fact, both Jiang Jing-guo and Li Deng-hui were presented with a historical opportunity to make contributions to the reunification of the motherland and could have become a hero in the Chinese history, because only by peaceful reunification can the strength of our nation remain intact: externally, to avoid fighting a war against the U.S. while internally, to grasp the opportunity to develop and achieve prosperity. Jiang Jing-guo belonged to the second generation of the Nationalist-Communist dispute and was seriously constrained by his family background.

Therefore, apart from sticking to the one-China concept, he failed to make due contributions to the reunification, which is historically regrettable. Although Li Deng-hui did not carry a similar historical burden, he was filled with animosity towards the Chinese nation, which gave rise to the instability in the relations between both sides of the Taiwan Straits and ultimately led to the current situation under which a military solution has to be considered. Li's behavior obviously caters to the taste of some anti-China US politicians, but when military actions become a must, neither Li Deng-hui nor those short-sighted anti-China US politicians will be able to control the outcome.

Based on the long-term interests and current strength of our country and our armed forces, the question that we have to consider is not Taiwan's capability to defend itself or what kind of war will be fought if the U.S. intervenes, but our tactics and timing, with regard to which we provide you with the following points of reference.

(1) The impact on economic development. Taking into account of possible intervention by the U.S. and based on the development strategy of our country, it is better to fight now than future -- the earlier, the better. The reason being that, if worst comes to worst, we will gain control of Taiwan before full deployment of the US troops. In this case, the only thing the U.S. can do is fighting a war with the purpose of retaliation, which will be similar to the Gulf War against Iraq or the recent bombing of Yugoslavia as far as its operational objective is considered, namely, to first attack from the sky and the sea our coastal military targets, and then attack our vital civil facilities so as to force us to accept its terms like Iraq and Yugoslavia.

This is of course wishful thinking. However, before completely destroying the attacking enemy forces from the sea and their auxiliary bases which together constitute a threat to us, even if we successfully carry out interception and control the sky, our military and civil

facilities will still incur some damages. The damages will be more extensive if the war cannot be ended within a short period of time and the U.S. launch the second and third strategic strikes, which will take a toll on the economic development of our country. If the above scenario cannot be avoided, an early war will delay the success of our reform whereas a later war will jeopardize the full achievement of the reform.

(2) The balance of strategic weaponry. From the perspective of winning a large-scale modern war with defense as the main purpose but involving local offensives, an early war has another advantage over a later war, namely, not counting the risk of a nuclear war, our conventional forces compare favorably with those of the U.S.. From a purely technical point of view, the US armed forces indeed have no match in the world, which characteristic constitutes the fundamental strength and framework of the U.S. in fighting a war.

However, what we are talking about above is the whole US military organization with its formal forces at the core, and the gigantic power also includes its advanced and powerful weaponry as well as its capability for nuclear strikes. Based on its structure, in times of strategic necessity, one third of its joint combat forces can be assembled and deployed for overseas operations within a short period of time, but this capability is limited to strategic flexibility. It may constitute a great deterrence to small military powers such as Iraq and Yugoslavia, but has no tactical advantage whatsoever in fighting against us, because we are close to home while they will be exhausted by the arduous expedition. When both sides rely mainly on missile strikes based on electronic confrontation, we evidently enjoy superiority in terms of the number of short-range and middle-range missiles.

So far the strategic superiority of the US joint forces has not been tested in a war against a big country. In contrast, using the Vietnamese War as an example, our forces do have the experience of fighting the US forces under modern warfare conditions. In that war, the Chinese forces were mainly responsible for air defense and accumulated a whole set of experience in this regard.

Things have changed significantly since then, but the most telling changes should have occurred to our forces in terms of personnel qualifications and weaponry, which are well-tuned to meet the requirements of modern warfare. In terms of air defense, it is impossible for the US air force to enjoy the kind of dominance which they maintained in Iraq or Yugoslavia.

Considering the morale of our forces and the nature of the war, and also considering the fact that the performance of the missiles on both sides is basically at the same level as well as the fact that both our defense and offence, which are the two major types of operation that can be imagined, will be carried out from our territory, the strategic superiority which can be claimed by the U.S. is close to zero. It does not even enjoy a sure advantage in terms of the foreseeable scale of war and the hi-tech content that can be applied to combat. It can be safely expected that once the U.S. launches an attack, the front line of the US forces and their supporting bases will be exposed within the range of our effective strikes. After the first strategic strike, the US forces will be faced with weaponry and logistic problems, providing us with opportunities for major offensives and win large battles.

(3) Reaction to and preparation for escalation of war. Basically, we do not foresee a nuclear war between China and the U.S., for two basic facts will prevent it. First, it is against the US interests to fight a nuclear war against China simply for Li Deng-hui and his followers. On this point the anti-China US politicians will have to respect public opinion within the U.S. Our principle is willing to sustain major losses of our armed forces to defend even just one square inch of land. If the US forces lose thousands or hundreds of men under our powerful strikes, the anti-war sentiment within their country will force the US government to take the same path as they did in Viet Nam. Unlike Iraq and Yugoslavia, China is not only a big country, but also possesses a nuclear arsenal that has long since been incorporated into state warfare system and played a real role in our national defense.

During the last crisis across the Taiwan Straits, the U.S. tried to blackmail us with their aircraft carrier(s), but when their spy satellites confirmed that our four nuclear submarines which used to be stationed at Lushun Harbor had disappeared, those politicians addicted to the Taiwan card could not imagine how worried their military commanders were. In comparison with the US nuclear arsenal, our disadvantage is mainly numeric, while in real wars the qualitative gap will be reflected only as different requirements of strategic theory. In terms of deterrence, there is not any difference in practical value.

So far we have built up the capability for the second and the third nuclear strikes and are fairly confident in fighting a nuclear war. The PCC has decided to pass through formal channels this message to the top leaders of the U.S. This is one of the concrete measures that we will take to prevent the escalation of war in the spirit of being responsible.

However, conceptually we are fully prepared for a prolonged warfare. Judging by each's domestic situation, it is the U.S. that will not be able to keep up for long. Historically, China has experience-prolonged warfare against foreign invasion, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has the ability to safeguard the peaceful production activities by the people of all nationalities in China during the war. We do not want to fight a prolonged war, but this is because our country's basic principle is preserving peace and developing economy, not because we are afraid.

Prolonged warfare will work to our advantage and enable us to defeat the enemy, which will be one of our strategic options to win the war under extreme circumstances.

(4) The basic principle of military operation against Taiwan. Our operational planning has been receiving extensive attention, not just from the U.S.; some friendly countries have also inquired about our intentions on various occasions. Foreign news media have published speculations on this topic, too. Since these speculations were based on research done by experts and specialized institutions, they did score some points. However, strategic perspectives can only be valuable when matched with battle operations and tactics.

The key factor that has caused the West's lack of understanding of the capability of our armed forces to fight a modern war is bias and prejudice. The quality and level of their studies have not changed much since the early 1980s. For instance, some US studies questioned the capability of our armed forces to resolve Taiwan issue. The method employed in such studies

is typical of studies on positional warfare under modern conditions. Since Li Deng-hui came to power, Taiwan's military equipment has been updated, basically completing the generation change of the combat arms. However, how much this has enhanced the combat power of the Taiwan forces is yet to be seen, because the Taiwan forces do not have any combat experience and will not be able to stand the test of a large-scale war, which is a fatal weakness.

For many years, Taiwan's defense system and war planning have not gone beyond the operational procedures of so-called air superiority, sea superiority, and resistance to landing and therefore will not be able to react accurately to the basic warfare model of instant, large-scale, and fully-extended operations. In particular, geographically Taiwan occupies only a small area. Although the quality of its equipment is not too bad, its quantity is limited. It is obvious that after the first fatal strike, the Taiwan forces have no way to organize effective resistance. Under such circumstances, we will be able to control Taiwan before the US intervention and then concentrate our forces to fight the U.S. Based on this scenario, it is impossible for the U.S. to force us to fight on two fronts when it tries to protect Taiwan.

4. To fully understand the PCC's Preparation for Resolution of Taiwan Issue Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, and to resolve Taiwan issue and achieve reunification of the motherland is purely a concern of the Chinese government and the Chinese people. On this issue we will not take orders from anyone, nor do we allow anyone to point their fingers at us.

Li Deng-hui's reliance on foreign forces shows that he does not understand the determination and capability of the Chinese government and the PLA in resolving Taiwan issue; it also shows that he does not care about the best interests of the Taiwan people. Before we take necessary reactions to Li and his followers motherland-splitting conduct, he will continue to create an atmosphere for splitting in answer to the call of a handful of anti-China US politicians and in an attempt to manipulate political trends in Taiwan, further poisoning the relationships between the two sides across the Straits. This will surely cause concern and discontent of neighboring countries and regions and objectively benefit us by working against the public opinion.

First of all, to effectively reduce the rampant arrogance of Li Deng-hui and Taiwan's splitting forces represented by him and to adapt our armed forces to cross-the-Straits operations, the CMC has decided, in accordance with the directions of the PCC, to carry out, based on combat phases, a series of large-scale of military exercises in both southeast coastal and inland regions from now on through early September.

In comparison with the exercises in 1996, the PCC has not only made specific requirements as to the scale and the degree of combat likeness, but also clearly identified the target of these exercises, namely Taiwan's splitting forces represented by Li Deng-hui. These exercises will serve both as a warning to the Taiwan authorities and as a notice to the world of our current policy towards Taiwan. The timing for these exercises has been decided on by the PCC in consideration of the overall Taiwan policy, taking into account both internal and external as well as military and political factors. These exercises constitute a specific step and an important part of the current campaign waged by the Chinese people against the splitting under the leadership of our Party and government.

Internationally, President Jiang Zemin will go to Biskek in late September to attend the five-country summit meeting, including China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. The meeting will sum up and expand cooperation in the field of security and reach agreements on reduction of armed forces stationed along the borders and establishment of military trust. During the meeting, President Jiang Zemin will hold bilateral talks with President Yeltsin on political and military exchange and cooperation in face of challenges posed by new interventions out of hegemonism in international affairs.

The above efforts will not only eliminate security concerns in the rear by reducing the traditional pressure along our northeast and northwest borders, and increase the proportion of forces which can be moved to the southeast coastal regions, but also serve to ensure our exchanges with the outside world by land routes during the war. This is an important strategic decision to maintain social stability and normal exchanges with other countries in case we are forced to fight a full-scale war against the U.S.

Such a decision represents a concrete expression of the PCC's determination to resolve Taiwan issue. Apart from the above summit meeting, President Jiang Zemin will also make state visits to Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand in early September. He will meet with Clinton in mid-September to officially inform the U.S. of Chinese government's position on Taiwan issue. To complement the above visits, other Party and state leaders will also meet, either at home or abroad, leaders of a number of countries to manifest the Chinese government's determination to preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity and reunify the nation. These final efforts will promote the understanding of our position among countries throughout the world.

Domestically, our Party and government have intensified the effort to clean out corruption, taking organizational and administrative measures to preserve the outstanding tradition of the Party, to strengthen the relationships between Party cadres and ordinary people, and to alleviate popular discontent. At the ideological front, we grasped the opportunity and outlawed Falun Gong, rooting out the biggest tightly organized counterrevolutionary religious group with a platform and plans since the founding of our country and eliminating unstable factors in domestic politics. This measure has not only safeguarded the predominant position of materialism in the field of ideology, but also provided practical support for our armed forces to prepare for the war.

It must be pointed out that when we were dealing with Falun Gong, we had to bear on one hand pressure from the so-called human-rights-ism, on the other hand, the Sino-US relations were at a low ebb because of conflict in Yugoslavia; moreover, Li Deng-hui threw out his two-country theory and caused Taiwan issue to take an abrupt turn. Given all these factors, we had to consider carefully the timing and the strategy. In fact, the determination with which our Party and state did a way with Falun Gong reflected the overall evaluation of all the above factors. To outlaw Falun Gong was a preemptive measure aimed at the ultimate resolution of Taiwan issue, not only eliminating domestic trouble, but also paving the way for the reunification as well. Negative international reaction has proven to be limited, and the protest from the U.S. was particularly pale and powerless, fully demonstrating that our Party has the

ability and courage to gain advantage in complicated domestic and international struggles.

Between now and the end of the year, we will celebrate two grand occasions: the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and resumption of sovereignty over Macao. To properly handle these two big events will have great impact on the resolution of Taiwan issue. The National Day celebrations should focus on the splendid achievements of the 50 years. According to the directions of the PCC, the PLA shall play the predominant role in the celebrations and the development of our armed forces shall be a reflection of accomplishments in all walks of life, which shall be displayed through a large-scale review of armed forces to our people of all nationalities and the people around the world.

At the review, a number of advanced equipment and strategic weapons will be revealed to the outside world. Internally, this will enhance the morale of our people of all nationalities and inspire patriotism; externally, this will make clear to the world that we do have the capability to defend our country and promote reunification. Such a move constitutes an important link in our overall strategy on Taiwan. On December 20, with the resolution of Macao issue, the humiliation that the Chinese people have been subjected to for more than a century will be washed away and a new chapter of the ultimate reunification of the motherland will begin. The smooth transition of Macao shows that we have surmounted yet another hurdle along the path of reunification and Taiwan issue has entered a substantive phase. This is also a premeditated decision made by the PCC.

Although Li Deng-hui's splitting tricks have increased the possibility of a military solution and forced us to advance our timetable, they did not have any effect on our overall plan as far as priority is concerned. Our principle is seeking a peaceful solution and not resorting to military actions until the last moment. When this principle has been trampled upon and military actions become the only means to achieve reunification, we will not hesitate to carry out the historic mission that embodies the wishes of several generations. We will accomplish with our own hands the eternal cause of the reunification of the motherland. For our Party and government as well as the people of China, including the people of Taiwan, Taiwan issue is the last issue before the achievement of the complete reunification of the motherland. Peaceful and gradual reunification is not only in the best interests of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, but also in the long-term interests of the Chinese nation.

This reasonable solution was first proposed by our Party based on the changes in domestic and international situations. At present, the foundation of a peaceful dialogue between two sides has been destroyed and the possibility for military actions has been greatly increased. Even so, we still strive to bring about a peaceful solution, which option shall remain valid until the last moment.

Every commander and soldier in our armed forces shall keep in mind the expectations of our Party and our people, attach great importance to political orientation, science, and skills that will stand the tests, strive to acquire modern military expertise under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory, unwaveringly follow the leadership of the PCC with Comrade Jiang Zemin as its core, play the all-conquering role of the Great Wall of iron and steel, and make new contributions to our national defense and reunification of the motherland under the new

historical conditions.

General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army August 1, 1999.