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During the fourth cross-strait crisis (1995-1996), the U.S. deliberate policy of “strategic ambiguity” was no longer so ambiguous. The Chinese found a threshold that would provoke the United States to action. The Chinese military exercises of 1996 also created a negative response by other nations of the world. While none of them came out to support an increased military role to defend Taiwan, many of them did privately counsel China to exercise restraint. As a result, in 1997 China returned to the earlier policy of solving the Taiwan problem through peaceful means under the slogan of “peaceful reunification.”
One major change in Chinese official statements that occurred at this time was the clarification of the target of the use of force. For the first time a Chinese leader said that the main reason China reserved the right to use force to solve the Taiwan problem was to prevent outsiders from coming to the aid of Taiwan. They reinforced the policy that they would resolve the problem peacefully by themselves and they made clear the only three conditions under which they would use force: 1. If there is any major incident causing Taiwan to break away from China 2. If there is foreign occupation of Taiwan 3. If Taiwan authorities refuse to negotiate These conditions are now part of the PRC's 2005 Anti-Secession Law. |
TAIWAN STRAIT CRISES |
The First Cross-Strait Crisis: 1954-1955
China’s overall purpose was to drive a wedge between the United States and Taiwan by playing on public opinion which did not favor committing the United States to war over a couple of small offshore islands. To a lesser extent the attacks were intended to dissuade the SEATO powers from including Taiwan in its area of concern and to discourage the formation of a Northeast Asia Treaty Organization. Each time negotiations were highlighted in the press, the Chinese Communists increased the intensity of their bombing and attacks. As the negotiations profile lowered, the attack intensity lowered.
-- Strait Talk, Chapter 5: The Issues
Background
People's Republic of China (PRC)
Republic of China (ROC Taiwan)
- Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC (1954)
- Statement by Premier O. K. Yui before the Legislative Yuan (September 14, 1954)
- Speech by Premier Chen Cheng at the Closing Session of the Administrative Policy Review Conference (March 17, 1953)
- President Chiang Kai-shek's Statement Concerning that Part of President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message Bearing on Instructions to the U.S. Seventh Fleet (February 03, 1953)
United States of America (U.S.)
- Statement by U.S. Secretary of State John F. Dulles During His Visit to Taiwan (March 03, 1955)
- The US Congress Formosa Resolution (January 25-28, 1955)
- Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC (1954)
- President Eisenhower's State of the Union message bearing on instructions to the U. S. Seventh Fleet (February 02, 1953)
The Second Cross-Strait Crisis: 1958
The primary motivation for the attack was political; similar to that of the 1954-55 crisis. The first purpose was to drive the United States out of the Taiwan area by highlighting the danger of another (after Korea) U.S. – China war over a couple of insignificant offshore islands.
-- Strait Talk, Chapter 5: The Issues
Background
People's Republic of China (PRC)
Declassified Documents*
- Memoirs, Chinese Finance Bo Yibo, Excerpt on Preventing 'Peaceful Evolution' (1991)
- From the Journal of Ambassador S.F. Antonov, Summary of a Conversation with the Chairman of the CC CPC Mao Zedong (October 14 1959)
- Discussion between N.S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong (October 02 1959)
- Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, and Huang Kecheng (November 02 1958)
- Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, and Huang Kecheng (October 31 1958)
- Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai (October 11 1958)
- Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai (October 06 1958)
- Meeting Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Conversation with S.F. Antonov on the Taiwan Issue (Excerpt) (October 05 1958)
- Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Peng Dehuai (October 05 1958)
- Memorandum of conversation of comrade Mao Zedong at meeting with six delegates of the socialist countries (October 02 1958)
- Memorandum of Conversation: Premier Zhou Receives Indian Ambassador to China (September 30, 1958)
- Letter, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communist Party on the Soviet Union's Readiness to Provide Assistance to China in the Event of an Attack (September 27 1958)
- Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai (September 19 1958)
- Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng (September 13 1958)
- Telegram, Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh (September 10 1958)
- Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (Excerpt) (September 08 1958)
- Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council (Excerpt) (September 05 1958)
- Memoir by Wu Lengxi, 'Inside Story of the Decision Making During the Shelling of Jinmen' (August 1958)
- Instructions, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai (August 1958)
- Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng (July 1958)
*The declassified documents on the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis are sourced from the Wilson Center Digital Archives
Statements
Republic of China (ROC Taiwan)
United States of America (U.S.)
- This Would be the Signal for General Nuclear War (2010)
- Nukes in the Taiwan Straits Crisis (2008)
- Eisenhower Advisers Discussed Using Nuclear Weapons in China (2008)
- U.S. Nuclear War Planning Against China in the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis (2008)
- Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis of 1958 (1962)
- The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History (1966)
- State Department Memo on Nuclear War in the Taiwan Straits (August 1958)
- ROC-U.S. Joint Communiqué (1958)
- Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands (1958)
The Third Cross-Strait Crisis: 1962
As PRC leaders listened and watched they saw an increase in Taiwan’s conscription, visits by very senior U.S. leaders, and optimism about recovering the Mainland appeared in the newspapers. While the appointment (of Admiral Alan G. Kirk) and visits by U.S. leaders were intended to discourage an invasion by Chiang, Communist leaders probably got the opposite message that support was intended and they began to build up their forces in Fujian province, opposite Taiwan.
- Strait Talk, Chapter 5: The Issues
Context
Great Leap Forward (1958)
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (1960)
President Chiang Kai-Shek's New Year's Day Speech (January 01, 1962)
Appointment of Naval Admiral Alan Goodrich Kirk as U.S. Ambassador to Republic of China Taiwan (1962)
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (1960)
President Chiang Kai-Shek's New Year's Day Speech (January 01, 1962)
Appointment of Naval Admiral Alan Goodrich Kirk as U.S. Ambassador to Republic of China Taiwan (1962)
Republic of China (ROC Taiwan)
United States of America (U.S.)
The Cross-Strait Missile Crisis: 1994/1995-1996 |
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The PLA had never conducted an opposed amphibious operation so there was no military doctrine written for it. The approach to writing new military doctrine is like the development of many of China’s military, political and economic policies. First a test activity or demonstration project is tried and if it works it is refined and written as doctrine. These first two exercises (1994 and 1995) were the beginning of that process. They had to develop clear doctrine on how to integrate artillery, air forces, navy, marines and other logistics support. The confidence level was not high at the time, but the PLA was still able to demonstrate a large scale operation was possible and the emphasis on amphibious operations was a clear message to Taiwan.
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- Strait Talk, Chapter 5: The Issues
People's Republic of China (PRC) |
Table: Chinese Exercises (Weapons Used / Distance from Taiwan) (1994-1996)
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Date |
Weapons Used |
Distance from Taiwan |
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October 1994 |
Large scale combined arms (Army, Navy, Air Force) exercise |
100 miles |
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May 15, 1995 |
Underground Nuclear Test [1]
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Approx. miles 2000 |
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July 21-26, 1995 |
6 DF-15 (M-9) Missiles (Range 360 miles) |
87 miles |
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August 15-25, 1995 |
20 naval ships, 40 aircraft, artillery, anti-ship and anti-air missiles |
85 miles |
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| August 17, 1995
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Underground Nuclear Test |
Approx. miles 2000 |
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November 15-25, 1995 |
Large scale amphibious exercises
Dongshan Island, Fujian Province |
100 miles |
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March 8-15, 1996 |
4 DF-15 (M-9) |
(NE Zone 22 miles and SE Zone 33 miles) |
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March 12-20, 1996 |
Live fire naval and air exercises
10 ships, 40 aircraft (new Su-27 jet fighters) |
100 miles |
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| March 18-25, 1996
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Joint Ground, Navy, Air exercises |
90 miles |
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[1] Chinese Conduct Nuclear Bomb Test. The New York Times. 1995. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/16/world/chinese-conduct-nuclear-bomb-test.html (accessed 12 August 2015).
Republic of China (ROC Taiwan) |
Inaugural address of ROC 14th-term President Tsai Ing-wen (May 20, 2016)
President Chen Interviewed by Le Figaro (April 18, 2006)
Chen Washington Post Interview (March 13, 2006)
Chen Frankfurter Allgemeine Interview (March 10, 2006)
President Chen's Opening Remarks at National Security Conference (February 28, 2006)
Taipei on TMD : Will the Republic of China Participate in the Theater Missile Defense ? (March 11, 1999)
President Lee Teng-hui Inaugural Address (May 20, 1996)
President Chen Interviewed by Le Figaro (April 18, 2006)
Chen Washington Post Interview (March 13, 2006)
Chen Frankfurter Allgemeine Interview (March 10, 2006)
President Chen's Opening Remarks at National Security Conference (February 28, 2006)
Taipei on TMD : Will the Republic of China Participate in the Theater Missile Defense ? (March 11, 1999)
President Lee Teng-hui Inaugural Address (May 20, 1996)
Cross-Strait Dialogue |
Chronology: May 1995-April 1998*
1995
First preparatory consultation for the Second Round of the Koo-Wang Talks reaches 8 items of consensus, and decides to hold the second round of preparatory consultation talks in June in preparation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks in Beijing (May 27)
The Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) sends letter to the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) notifying the postponement of the Koo-Wang Talks (June 16)
Mainland Affairs Council announces the hope to continue regularized consultation across the Straits, and to hold the preparatory consultation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks as planned (June 17)
ARATS telephones SEF its decision to postpone the regularized cross-strait consultation (June 30)
Beijing launches the first round of missile tests in the Taiwan Straits (July 21-26)
Beijing announces the second round of missile tests in the Straits (August 15-25)
The Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) sends letter to the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) notifying the postponement of the Koo-Wang Talks (June 16)
Mainland Affairs Council announces the hope to continue regularized consultation across the Straits, and to hold the preparatory consultation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks as planned (June 17)
ARATS telephones SEF its decision to postpone the regularized cross-strait consultation (June 30)
Beijing launches the first round of missile tests in the Taiwan Straits (July 21-26)
Beijing announces the second round of missile tests in the Straits (August 15-25)
1996
PLA launches the third round of missile tests and military exercises on the eve of the ROC presidential election (March 8-23)
SEF sends letter to ARATS suggesting the resumption the Koo-Wang Talks and regularized consultation (April 29)
ARATS sends letter to SEF rejecting the request on the resumption the Koo-Wang Talks and regularized consultation (May 2)
SEF sends letter to ARATS suggesting exchange of visits of board of directors (July 3)
ARATS sends letter to SEF without responding to SEF's suggestion (July 5)
SEF sends letter to ARATS suggesting the resumption the Koo-Wang Talks and regularized consultation (April 29)
ARATS sends letter to SEF rejecting the request on the resumption the Koo-Wang Talks and regularized consultation (May 2)
SEF sends letter to ARATS suggesting exchange of visits of board of directors (July 3)
ARATS sends letter to SEF without responding to SEF's suggestion (July 5)
1997
ARATS sends letter to SEF inviting Secretary General Jen-ho Chiao to lead the delegation of SEF board of directors to attend a conference on economic and trade issues, and to tour mainland cities (November 6).
SEF sends letter to ARATS suggesting that Chairman Koo lead a delegation for a formal visit to meet with relevant persons, and that ARATS is welcome to visit Taiwan (November 7)
ARATS new release expresses regret that SEF rejects the November 6 letter of invitation without responding to the SEF's suggestion (November 11)
SEF sends letter to ARATS suggesting that Chairman Koo lead a delegation for a formal visit to meet with relevant persons, and that ARATS is welcome to visit Taiwan (November 7)
ARATS new release expresses regret that SEF rejects the November 6 letter of invitation without responding to the SEF's suggestion (November 11)
1998
SEF sends letter to ARATS requesting a reply of the November 7 letter (January 19)
ROC Premier Siew reiterates Taipei consistent position on resumption of cross-strait exchanges and consultation in his report to the Legislature (February 20)
ARATS sends letter to SEF expressing its willingness for resuming cross-strait consultation and arranging exchanges between SEF and ARATS (February 24)
SEF sends letter to ARATS welcoming the February 24 letter of response and indicating the intention to send appropriate members of SEF to the Mainland (March 5)
ARATS sends letter to SEF inviting a SEF-led delegation for touring and conference (March 11)
SEF sends letter to ARATS proposing to send appropriate members of SEF to the Mainland by mid-April (March 17)
ARATS sends letter to SEF welcoming SEF delegation to visit the Mainland and requesting SEF to propose concrete exchange items (March 26)
SEF sends letter to ARATS proposing that deputy secretary level-led delegation visit mainland around mid-April (April 3)
ARATS sends letter to SEF welcoming and proposing SEF's deputy secretary level-led delegation visit mainland on April 21 or 22 (April 13)
SEF sends letter to ARATS suggesting that SEF Deputy Secretary-general Jan Jyh-horng lead a delegation go to Beijing during April 22-24 (April 17)
ARATS sends letter to SEF agreeing the proposal in April 17 SEF letter (April 20)
ROC Premier Siew reiterates Taipei consistent position on resumption of cross-strait exchanges and consultation in his report to the Legislature (February 20)
ARATS sends letter to SEF expressing its willingness for resuming cross-strait consultation and arranging exchanges between SEF and ARATS (February 24)
SEF sends letter to ARATS welcoming the February 24 letter of response and indicating the intention to send appropriate members of SEF to the Mainland (March 5)
ARATS sends letter to SEF inviting a SEF-led delegation for touring and conference (March 11)
SEF sends letter to ARATS proposing to send appropriate members of SEF to the Mainland by mid-April (March 17)
ARATS sends letter to SEF welcoming SEF delegation to visit the Mainland and requesting SEF to propose concrete exchange items (March 26)
SEF sends letter to ARATS proposing that deputy secretary level-led delegation visit mainland around mid-April (April 3)
ARATS sends letter to SEF welcoming and proposing SEF's deputy secretary level-led delegation visit mainland on April 21 or 22 (April 13)
SEF sends letter to ARATS suggesting that SEF Deputy Secretary-general Jan Jyh-horng lead a delegation go to Beijing during April 22-24 (April 17)
ARATS sends letter to SEF agreeing the proposal in April 17 SEF letter (April 20)
United States of America (U.S.) |
Amendment to H.R. 2415 - American Embassy Security Act (July 21, 1999)
H.R.1838 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act ((Introduced) May 18, 1999)
Report to Congress on the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (February 1999)
H.Con.Res. 22 - Providing that the President should seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat to use force, against Taiwan, and that the United States should help Taiwan in case of threats or a military attack by the People's Republic of China (February 03, 1999)
H.R. Con. Res. 270 Acknowledging the positive role of Taiwan in the current Asian financial crisis and affirming the support of the American people for peace and stability on the Taiwan Strait and security for Taiwan's democracy ((Introduced) April 30, 1998)
U.S. Resolution Expressing the United State's Continued Support for Taiwan (July 10, 1998)
U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act (November 06, 1997)
Secretary of State Christopher on Improving Relations with China (May 17, 1996)
U.S., China Quietly Worked To Defuse Taiwan Crisis (March 31, 1996)
U.S. Department of State on March 1996 Taiwan Strait Tensions (March 14, 1996)
Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for U.S. foreign policy -- Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, (March 14, 1996)
H.Con.Res.138 - Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the movement toward democracy by the 21,000,000 people of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and addressing the increasingly dangerous behavior of the People's Republic of China (January 31, 1996)
S.Con.Res. 9 (104th): A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States (Introduced: March 06, 1995)
H.Con.Res.53 - Expresses the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States (Introduced: March 29, 1995)
H.Con.Res. 33 (104th): Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States (Introduced: March 06, 1995).
Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996
Biographic Sketch of "Lieutenant General XIONG Guangkai," October 1996
H.R.1838 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act ((Introduced) May 18, 1999)
Report to Congress on the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (February 1999)
H.Con.Res. 22 - Providing that the President should seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat to use force, against Taiwan, and that the United States should help Taiwan in case of threats or a military attack by the People's Republic of China (February 03, 1999)
H.R. Con. Res. 270 Acknowledging the positive role of Taiwan in the current Asian financial crisis and affirming the support of the American people for peace and stability on the Taiwan Strait and security for Taiwan's democracy ((Introduced) April 30, 1998)
U.S. Resolution Expressing the United State's Continued Support for Taiwan (July 10, 1998)
U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act (November 06, 1997)
Secretary of State Christopher on Improving Relations with China (May 17, 1996)
U.S., China Quietly Worked To Defuse Taiwan Crisis (March 31, 1996)
U.S. Department of State on March 1996 Taiwan Strait Tensions (March 14, 1996)
Crisis in the Taiwan Strait: Implications for U.S. foreign policy -- Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, second session, (March 14, 1996)
H.Con.Res.138 - Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the movement toward democracy by the 21,000,000 people of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and addressing the increasingly dangerous behavior of the People's Republic of China (January 31, 1996)
S.Con.Res. 9 (104th): A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States (Introduced: March 06, 1995)
H.Con.Res.53 - Expresses the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States (Introduced: March 29, 1995)
H.Con.Res. 33 (104th): Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States (Introduced: March 06, 1995).
Chinese Exercise Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996
Biographic Sketch of "Lieutenant General XIONG Guangkai," October 1996
*The Chronology is from The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), Executive Yuan, Republic of China (ROC Taiwan)