One China, Five Interpretations
September 12, 2016 | Judith Norton, Ph.D.*
Summary
The concept of ‘one China’ is the long-standing framework guiding relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China ((ROC) Taiwan), and the United States of America (U.S.). But there are five different interpretations of the concept: The PRC has two; the U.S. has two; and Taiwan has one. To date, scholars and experts have yet to parse the different interpretations of this concept. This forthcoming e-book fills that gap.*
The five interpretations of the concept of 'one China' are as follows: PRC maintains a "One China Principle"(一个中国的原则), which means one China with two systems as now exists with Hong Kong and Macao. The U.S. pursues a "One China Policy" (一个中国的政策), which contains two competing frameworks: the communiqué framework that consists of the three U.S.-PRC communiqués while the second framework consists of 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Six Assurances (1982), and Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué. The U.S. position compels the PRC to advocate that the U.S. follow a “One China Policy” consisting of the communiqués framework as well as the Three Non-Supports( (三不支持). Lastly, the ROC interpretation is evolving from the original understanding when the Kuomintang was in complete control of political policy in Taiwan. That understanding was based upon the 1992 Consensus (One China under the Kuomintang 一個中國中華民國) and the “Six Assurances” from the United States that stated the U.S. would promote a peaceful resolution to the problem, would not mediate between the two, but would continue arms sales to Taiwan to reinforce its defense. Since the Democratic Progressive Party has now replaced the KMT in Taiwan there are efforts to redefine the relationship to allow for more Taiwan independence. This includes the active promotion of the DPP’s interpretation of the status quo, which is that Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country, as well as the active rejection of the "One China Principle" and the 1992 Consensus. At the heart of the matter are the issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regime legitimacy in Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, in China.
As for the PRC, the CPC designed the “One China Principle” (一个中国的原则) as its Taiwan reunification strategy. The Chinese Principle’s foundation is the official position of the CPC that the ‘government of the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China and there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China’. On this basis, it created the formula of “peaceful reunification; one country, two systems” (和平统一、一国两制). The formula contains the process, such as people-to-people exchanges and economic integration, as well as the final outcome of reunification, namely the implementation of a modified version of “one country, two systems” in which the CPC demotes Taiwan to a special administrative region of China. The Principle also contains the method of reunification: through means of peace or force, with an emphasis on the former and a reluctance to drop the latter, which is directed at Taiwan independence forces on and off the island as well as foreign forces, namely the U.S. The leadership’s commitment to a peaceful settlement is evidenced by its restraint to not liberate Taiwan by force for decades. The “One China Principle” is the CPC’s long-standing version of “One China” and its interpretation of the “1992 Consensus”.
The U.S. however follows the “One China Policy” ” (一个中国的政策). The Policy is based on informal and formal institutions that serve as the basis for U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations. The communiqués framework ( the U.S.-PRC joint communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982) undergirds the former and the latter ties, while U.S.-Taiwan relations are based on a second framework consisting of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Six Assurances (1982), and Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué. Both frameworks support the peaceful settlement of the cross-strait issue, but they contain contradictions such as the U.S.'s acknowledgement of the concept of 'one China'; moreover, they provide political and military recognition to Taiwan through arms sales, as well as a deterrence guarantee.
The Chinese leadership wants the U.S. government to follow a “One China Policy” consisting of only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports (三不支持). The Three Non-supports or the Three No’s are: no support for “two Chinas”; “one China, one Taiwan”; and “membership to international organizations that require statehood”. China actively opposes the second framework that directs US-Taiwan relations in large part because the TRA and the Six Assurances grant recognition to the Taiwanese authorities while denying Chinese sovereignty claims over Taiwan. Furthermore, China strong opposes the U.S. government’s campaign to create international space for Taiwan. Two interpretations of the “One China Policy” exist, with the Chinese leadership’s version promoting only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports, while actively opposing the second framework that guides US-Taiwan ties.
As for Taiwan, the KMT and the DPP reject the "One China Principle" as well as the "One China Policy". The former contends that Taiwan is part of China, whereas the latter contends that Taiwan's sovereignty remains to be determined. From the perception of both political parties, Taiwan's sovereignty is already determined: It is an independent, sovereign country. The issue for both parties is: What is Taiwan's future? For the KMT, it actively promotes reunification with China. But the KMT wants to unify with the PRC in accordance with the system of democracy as it is practiced on Taiwan. From the KMT viewpoint, “One China” refers to the ROC founded in 1911 with de jure sovereignty over all of China but with jurisdiction over only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. The DPP’s “ROC equals Taiwan” has not gained traction but represent the party's position that “the Republic of China (ROC) is Taiwan and Taiwan is the ROC". The ROC government now is no longer an alien government.” The DPP most likely wants to abandon the concept of ‘one China’ as well as the phrase 1992 Consensus which represents the One China Principle. In place of 'one China' (and its attendant concepts) the DPP wants to create a new framework that not only supports cross-strait ties but also allows Taiwan to maintain a separate state from the PRC, particularly from the PRC system.
The five readings of “One China” produce key similarities as well as major differences that create common ground and conflicts. This e-book examines these commonalities and conflicts, with a focus on analyzing the underlying issues of sovereignty, territorial, and regime legitimacy. It concludes that several battlegrounds are emerging between the U.S., specifically Congress and the PRC over U.S.-Taiwan ties, between the PRC and the DPP over the One China Principle and attendant concepts of 1992 Consensus, as well as the DPP and the KMT in the political, economic, and military arenas. The current U.S. administration, as well as Congress, needs to understand these emerging trends in cross-strait affairs in order to pursue more effective policies that maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in the Indo-Pacific region.
The five interpretations of the concept of 'one China' are as follows: PRC maintains a "One China Principle"(一个中国的原则), which means one China with two systems as now exists with Hong Kong and Macao. The U.S. pursues a "One China Policy" (一个中国的政策), which contains two competing frameworks: the communiqué framework that consists of the three U.S.-PRC communiqués while the second framework consists of 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Six Assurances (1982), and Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué. The U.S. position compels the PRC to advocate that the U.S. follow a “One China Policy” consisting of the communiqués framework as well as the Three Non-Supports( (三不支持). Lastly, the ROC interpretation is evolving from the original understanding when the Kuomintang was in complete control of political policy in Taiwan. That understanding was based upon the 1992 Consensus (One China under the Kuomintang 一個中國中華民國) and the “Six Assurances” from the United States that stated the U.S. would promote a peaceful resolution to the problem, would not mediate between the two, but would continue arms sales to Taiwan to reinforce its defense. Since the Democratic Progressive Party has now replaced the KMT in Taiwan there are efforts to redefine the relationship to allow for more Taiwan independence. This includes the active promotion of the DPP’s interpretation of the status quo, which is that Taiwan is an independent, sovereign country, as well as the active rejection of the "One China Principle" and the 1992 Consensus. At the heart of the matter are the issues of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and regime legitimacy in Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, in China.
As for the PRC, the CPC designed the “One China Principle” (一个中国的原则) as its Taiwan reunification strategy. The Chinese Principle’s foundation is the official position of the CPC that the ‘government of the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China and there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China’. On this basis, it created the formula of “peaceful reunification; one country, two systems” (和平统一、一国两制). The formula contains the process, such as people-to-people exchanges and economic integration, as well as the final outcome of reunification, namely the implementation of a modified version of “one country, two systems” in which the CPC demotes Taiwan to a special administrative region of China. The Principle also contains the method of reunification: through means of peace or force, with an emphasis on the former and a reluctance to drop the latter, which is directed at Taiwan independence forces on and off the island as well as foreign forces, namely the U.S. The leadership’s commitment to a peaceful settlement is evidenced by its restraint to not liberate Taiwan by force for decades. The “One China Principle” is the CPC’s long-standing version of “One China” and its interpretation of the “1992 Consensus”.
The U.S. however follows the “One China Policy” ” (一个中国的政策). The Policy is based on informal and formal institutions that serve as the basis for U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations. The communiqués framework ( the U.S.-PRC joint communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 1982) undergirds the former and the latter ties, while U.S.-Taiwan relations are based on a second framework consisting of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Six Assurances (1982), and Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué. Both frameworks support the peaceful settlement of the cross-strait issue, but they contain contradictions such as the U.S.'s acknowledgement of the concept of 'one China'; moreover, they provide political and military recognition to Taiwan through arms sales, as well as a deterrence guarantee.
The Chinese leadership wants the U.S. government to follow a “One China Policy” consisting of only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports (三不支持). The Three Non-supports or the Three No’s are: no support for “two Chinas”; “one China, one Taiwan”; and “membership to international organizations that require statehood”. China actively opposes the second framework that directs US-Taiwan relations in large part because the TRA and the Six Assurances grant recognition to the Taiwanese authorities while denying Chinese sovereignty claims over Taiwan. Furthermore, China strong opposes the U.S. government’s campaign to create international space for Taiwan. Two interpretations of the “One China Policy” exist, with the Chinese leadership’s version promoting only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports, while actively opposing the second framework that guides US-Taiwan ties.
As for Taiwan, the KMT and the DPP reject the "One China Principle" as well as the "One China Policy". The former contends that Taiwan is part of China, whereas the latter contends that Taiwan's sovereignty remains to be determined. From the perception of both political parties, Taiwan's sovereignty is already determined: It is an independent, sovereign country. The issue for both parties is: What is Taiwan's future? For the KMT, it actively promotes reunification with China. But the KMT wants to unify with the PRC in accordance with the system of democracy as it is practiced on Taiwan. From the KMT viewpoint, “One China” refers to the ROC founded in 1911 with de jure sovereignty over all of China but with jurisdiction over only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. The DPP’s “ROC equals Taiwan” has not gained traction but represent the party's position that “the Republic of China (ROC) is Taiwan and Taiwan is the ROC". The ROC government now is no longer an alien government.” The DPP most likely wants to abandon the concept of ‘one China’ as well as the phrase 1992 Consensus which represents the One China Principle. In place of 'one China' (and its attendant concepts) the DPP wants to create a new framework that not only supports cross-strait ties but also allows Taiwan to maintain a separate state from the PRC, particularly from the PRC system.
The five readings of “One China” produce key similarities as well as major differences that create common ground and conflicts. This e-book examines these commonalities and conflicts, with a focus on analyzing the underlying issues of sovereignty, territorial, and regime legitimacy. It concludes that several battlegrounds are emerging between the U.S., specifically Congress and the PRC over U.S.-Taiwan ties, between the PRC and the DPP over the One China Principle and attendant concepts of 1992 Consensus, as well as the DPP and the KMT in the political, economic, and military arenas. The current U.S. administration, as well as Congress, needs to understand these emerging trends in cross-strait affairs in order to pursue more effective policies that maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and in the Indo-Pacific region.
*The first article based on my research of this topic was published on The Diplomat in 2016.
|
See our policy on republication, attribution, and derivatives here.
|
 |