USE OF FORCE

The Chinese have made it clear that they cannot renounce the use of force to recover Taiwan, but they have never explained exactly what type of force. Most recent descriptions have been about using high tech warfare for a quick and overwhelming strike or force to be used against a foreign power. Realistically, however, the approach to the use of force is likely to favor threat forms that have a maximum political impact as opposed to a military impact. That means beginning with some form of naval blockade.

Strait Talk, Chapter Four: The Military Factor

Background on the PRC Use of Force

The Chinese have made it clear that they cannot renounce the use of force to recover Taiwan,
but they have never explained exactly what type of force. Most recent descriptions, as discussed in Strait Talk Chapter Four: The Military Factor, have been about using high tech warfare for a quick and overwhelming strike or force to be used against a foreign power.

Realistically, however, the approach to the use of force is likely to favor threat forms that have a maximum political impact as opposed to a military impact. That means beginning with some form of naval blockade.

Some Chinese military analysts have studied America’s participation in Vietnam, Somalia and
Iraq and concluded that its Achilles heel is political will. If a war can be protracted and if a few
casualties can be inflicted, the American people will turn against the war and cause the forces to withdraw. This is counterbalanced by studies of the Gulf War and the Kosovo Campaign in which high tech equipment allowed a quick no-casualty victory.

When these lessons are applied to a potential Taiwan Strait scenario we find the some
Chinese thinking in terms of achieving a quick victory by "decapitating" Taiwan's leadership and
crushing Taiwan’s military capability to wage war before the United States could respond. They note that a quick U.S. reaction is less likely if the U.S. is preoccupied with the war against terrorism. Since Taiwan has had fifty years to prepare for such an attack and has hardened or hidden most critical military targets, both sides concede that this scenario is not likely.

A more likely scenario would be to start slow with a naval economic blockade to cause
economic chaos in Taiwan. They would attempt to influence Taiwan’s leaders by taking military
actions that would cause political or economic consequences like causing the Taiwan stock market to plummet as it did in the 1995/1996 missile exercise crisis. They would announce that the purpose of their use of force would be to force Taiwan to the negotiating table, not to conquer and occupy the island. This would be part of an effort to take the moral high ground and attract world opinion to their cause. They would prevent shipping from reaching Taiwan and since Taiwan must trade to survive it would place immediate pressure on Taiwan to solve the problem. Part of this effort would be to discourage all forms of foreign investment in Taiwan. At the same time they would place pressure on the many Taiwanese businessmen investing in and residing in China to cause Taiwan's leaders to enter negotiations over the sovereignty of Taiwan.

They would also issue the standard warnings to the United States to not “interfere in China’s
internal affairs” in the hope of delaying American entry into the situation. They would spend
much time explaining the economic consequences of American participation for the American
audience and at the same time they would use all forms of political warfare to condemn the
Taiwanese independence advocates for instigating the situation and for refusing to negotiate. They would also describe the conflict as a domestic issue.

The Chinese would wait for U.S. aircraft carriers to arrive and delay contact for as long as
possible. Once they are engaged by U.S. forces they believe they can – using cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, anti-satellite warfare, information warfare, submarines, modern Russian destroyers and jet fighters – find a way to inflict enough damage on the U.S. Navy to cause American popular support to be withdrawn and ultimately pull out.

An American developed response scenario is likely to focus on the stand-off non-casualty attack strategy as used in the Kosovo Campaign. After all, the mission is simple from a U.S.
perspective – stop a blockade or invasion of Taiwan. Most of the battlefield is the 100 miles of
water between China and Taiwan. There are no jungles, trees or caves. Some effort would go into destroying missile emplacements along the coast. Modern surveillance and weapons systems could sink all Chinese vessels in that area and destroy the Chinese naval and air capability. The U.S. Navy is confident it could accomplish this mission without much difficulty. If the conflict intensified air force bombers could be stationed in Okinawa, Guam or even Taiwan. The key is that the conflict could be limited to military targets to avoid civilian casualties and the bombing or missile attacks could be conducted from afar to avoid direct contact with Chinese military forces. It is such an ideal geostrategic situation that entering such a conflict would be relatively easy.

These scenarios are made possible because each side has confidence that success is possible. The probability that this scenario is initiated is based upon three possible miscalculations:

(1) Chinese military leaders believe they can inflict enough damage on U.S. forces to cause them to withdraw,

(2) American military leaders believe superior technology and weapons would make the task
relatively easy and risk free, and

(3) the Taiwanese believe the U.S. would certainly come to their aid, no matter the circumstances, because of continued U.S. congressional support for their democratic
government.

The Taiwanese action would have to be the first and the others would follow. The
problem is that it makes no difference if these beliefs are true or not. What matters is that they are believed and that makes the decision to take action much easier from each perspective.

- Excerpts from Strait Talk, Chapter Four: The Military Factor

Implications for the Cross-Strait Relationship

Coming soon.

People's Republic of China on the Use of Force

Our position of never undertaking to renounce the use of force is not directed at our Taiwan compatriots, but is 'aimed at foreign forces' attempts to interfere in China's reunification and the Taiwan separatist forces' schemes for Taiwan independence.

-- President Jiang Zemin to the 16th
Chinese Party Congress
Nov. 7, 2002

PRC Statements and Documents on the Use of Force

PRC Leaders on Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan

PRC Statements on Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan

Republic of China (ROC Taiwan) on the Use of Force

We must solemnly point out the Republic of China does not succumb to military threat of any kind. Armed forces or military threat can not solve any problem; rather it creates more problems.

-- Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)
(2000)

ROC Statements on the Use of Force and Peace

The United States of America on the Use of Force

It is the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

-- 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)
Section 2 (b)(6)

PRC, TAIWAN, U.S. RELATIONS: THE USE OF FORCE

​​USE OF FORCE