PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND THE U.S. OVER TAIWAN
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PRC, TAIWAN, U.S. RELATIONS: THE USE OF FORCE

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​
​USE OF FORCE 

The Chinese have made it clear that they cannot renounce the use of  force  to recover Taiwan, but they have never explained exactly what type of force.  Most recent descriptions have been about using high tech warfare for a quick and overwhelming strike or force to be used against a foreign power.  Realistically, however, the approach to the use of force is likely to favor threat forms that have a maximum political impact as opposed to a military impact.  That means beginning with some form of naval blockade.
Strait Talk, Chapter Four: The Military Factor

Background on the PRC Use of Force

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The Chinese have made it clear that they cannot renounce the use of force to recover Taiwan,
but they have never explained exactly what type of force. Most recent descriptions, as discussed in Strait Talk Chapter Four: The Military Factor, have been about using high tech warfare for a quick and overwhelming strike or force to be used against a foreign power.

Realistically, however, the approach to the use of force is likely to favor threat forms that have a maximum political impact as opposed to a military impact. That means beginning with some form of naval blockade.

Some Chinese military analysts have studied America’s participation in Vietnam, Somalia and
Iraq and concluded that its Achilles heel is political will. If a war can be protracted and if a few
casualties can be inflicted, the American people will turn against the war and cause the forces to withdraw.  This is counterbalanced by studies of the Gulf War and the Kosovo Campaign in which high tech equipment allowed a quick no-casualty victory.

When these lessons are applied to a potential Taiwan Strait scenario we find the some
Chinese thinking in terms of achieving a quick victory by "decapitating" Taiwan's leadership and
crushing Taiwan’s military capability to wage war before the United States could respond.  They note that a quick U.S. reaction is less likely if the U.S. is preoccupied with the war against terrorism.  Since Taiwan has had fifty years to prepare for such an attack and has hardened or hidden most critical military targets, both sides concede that this scenario is not likely.

A more likely scenario would be to start slow with a naval economic blockade to cause
economic chaos in Taiwan. They would attempt to influence Taiwan’s leaders by taking military
actions that would cause political or economic consequences like causing the Taiwan stock market to plummet as it did in the 1995/1996 missile exercise crisis. They would announce that the purpose of their use of force would be to force Taiwan to the negotiating table, not to conquer and occupy the island. This would be part of an effort to take the moral high ground and attract world opinion to their cause. They would prevent shipping from reaching Taiwan and since Taiwan must trade to survive it would place immediate pressure on Taiwan to solve the problem. Part of this effort would be to discourage all forms of foreign investment in Taiwan. At the same time they would place pressure on the many Taiwanese businessmen investing in and residing in China to cause Taiwan's leaders to enter negotiations over the sovereignty of Taiwan.

They would also issue the standard warnings to the United States to not “interfere in China’s
internal affairs” in the hope of delaying American entry into the situation. They would spend
much time explaining the economic consequences of American participation for the American
audience and at the same time they would use all forms of political warfare to condemn the
Taiwanese independence advocates for instigating the situation and for refusing to negotiate. They would also describe the conflict as a domestic issue.

The Chinese would wait for U.S. aircraft carriers to arrive and delay contact for as long as
possible. Once they are engaged by U.S. forces they believe they can – using cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, anti-satellite warfare, information warfare, submarines, modern Russian destroyers and jet fighters – find a way to inflict enough damage on the U.S. Navy to cause American popular support to be withdrawn and ultimately pull out.

An American developed response scenario is likely to focus on the stand-off non-casualty attack strategy as used in the Kosovo Campaign. After all, the mission is simple from a U.S.
perspective – stop a blockade or invasion of Taiwan. Most of the battlefield is the 100 miles of
water between China and Taiwan. There are no jungles, trees or caves. Some effort would go into destroying missile emplacements along the coast. Modern surveillance and weapons systems could sink all Chinese vessels in that area and destroy the Chinese naval and air capability. The U.S. Navy is confident it could accomplish this mission without much difficulty. If the conflict intensified air force bombers could be stationed in Okinawa, Guam or even Taiwan.  The key is that the conflict could be limited to military targets to avoid civilian casualties and the bombing or missile attacks could be conducted from afar to avoid direct contact with Chinese military forces. It is such an ideal geostrategic situation that entering such a conflict would be relatively easy.

These scenarios are made possible because each side has confidence that success is possible. The probability that this scenario is initiated is based upon three possible miscalculations:

(1) Chinese military leaders believe they can inflict enough damage on U.S. forces to cause them to withdraw,

(2) American military leaders believe superior technology and weapons would make the task
relatively easy and risk free, and

(3) the Taiwanese believe the U.S. would certainly come to their aid, no matter the circumstances, because of continued U.S. congressional support for their democratic
government.

The Taiwanese action would have to be the first and the others would follow. The
problem is that it makes no difference if these beliefs are true or not. What matters is that they are believed and that makes the decision to take action much easier from each perspective.
- Excerpts from Strait Talk, Chapter Four: The Military Factor

Implications for the Cross-Strait Relationship

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Coming soon.

People's Republic of China on the Use of Force

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Our position of never undertaking to renounce the use of force is not directed at our Taiwan compatriots, but is 'aimed at foreign forces' attempts to interfere in China's reunification and the Taiwan separatist forces' schemes for Taiwan independence.
-- President Jiang Zemin to the 16th
Chinese Party Congress
​Nov. 7, 2002

PRC Statements and Documents on the Use of Force

  • Chinese official threatens forced unity (2017)
  • Chinese mainland: military threat to Taiwan "inconsistent with the facts" (2011)
  • Full text of explanations on draft Anti-Secession Law (2005)
  • Army to smash any independence plot: Minister (2004)
  • ​Premier Wen: China Will Consider A Reunification Law (2004)
  • China's Policy on Taiwan Remains Unchanged: Premier Zhu (2002)
  • President Jiang Calls for Joint Reunification Efforts Across Taiwan Straits​ (2000)
  • China 'Taiwan Independence' Will Not Mean Peace: Qian Qichen (2000)
  • Li Zhaoxing: No Change in China's Policy on Taiwan Question​ (2000)
  • Qian Qichen: China's Policy on Taiwan Issue Consistent (2000)
  • Presidents Clinton and Jiang at APEC Meeting (1999)
  • ​Jiang: China Not to Abandon Use of Force if Taiwan Seeks Independence (1999)
  • Another Dangerous Step by Lee Teng-hui (1999)
  • China's National Defense (Excerpt Part II: National Defense Policy)(1998) ​
  • Jiang Zemin's Report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of  China (1997)
  • The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China (1993)
  • Deng Xiaoping “One Country, Two Systems” (1984)
  • Message to Compatriots in Taiwan (1979)
  • Mao on the Use of Force (1973)
  • Second Message to Compatriots in Taiwan - PRC Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai (1958)
  • PRC's Declaration on the Territorial Sea (1958)
  • Meeting Minutes, Zhou Enlai's Conversation with S.F. Antonov on the Taiwan Issue (Excerpt) (October 05 1958)
  • Summary of the Views of Afro-Asian Countries on the Taiwan Issue at the Afro-Asian Conference (May 1955)
  • Memorandum of Conversation Between Soviet Premier Georgy M. Malenkov and Zhou Enlai (July 1954)
  • Telegram, CCP Central Committee to Zhou Enlai, Concerning Policies and Measures in the Struggle Against the United States and Jiang Jieshi After the Geneva Conference (July 1954)
  • PRC Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's Statement Refuting Truman's Statements of June 27, 1950, and June 28, 1950 (1950)

PRC Leaders on Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan

  • Hu Jintao's Four-point Guideline (2005) 
  • Jiang Zemin's Eight-point Proposal (1995)
  • Deng Xiaoping's Six Conceptions (1983)
  • Ye Jianying on Taiwan's Return to Motherland​ (1981)

PRC Statements on Peaceful Reunification with Taiwan

  • Senior CPC leader stresses peaceful development of cross-Strait relations, Xinhua (December 22, 2017) 
  • ​Mainland opposes military interaction between the U.S. and Taiwan: spokesperson, Xinhua (December 13, 2017)
  • Beijing to hold forum on cross-Strait peaceful development (October 2016)
  • U.S.-China Joint Statement (2009)
  • Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Straits Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation (2008)
  • Hu Jintao's report at 17th Party Congress (2007)
  • Wu Bangguo Delivers an Important Speech to the Brazilian Parliament​ (2006)
  • Full text of explanations on draft Anti-Secession Law (2005)
  • China will never tolerate Taiwan independence: Jiang Zemin (2004)
  • Premier: Mainland Will Never Allow Anyone to Split Taiwan (2004)
  • President Hu Jintao Addresses Australian Parliament (2003) ​
  • Vice FM Zhou Wenzhong calls on U.S. to stop upgrading relations with Taiwan (2003)
  • China's Policy on Taiwan Remains Unchanged: Premier Zhu (2002)
  • President Jiang Zemin Meets the New York Times (2001)
  • Taiwan New Leader Lacks Sincerity: Statement​ (2000)
  • President Jiang Calls for Joint Reunification Efforts Across Taiwan Straits​ (2000)
  • China 'Taiwan Independence' Will Not Mean Peace: Qian Qichen (2000)
  • Li Zhaoxing: No Change in China's Policy on Taiwan Question​ (2000)
  • Qian Qichen: China's Policy on Taiwan Issue Consistent (2000)
  • Presidents Clinton and Jiang at APEC Meeting (1999)
  • Qian Qichen on Peaceful Reunification Across Taiwan Straits (1999)
  • Chinese Ambassador Refutes Attempts to Split China (1997)
  • Jiang Zemin's Eight-point Proposal (1995)
  • PRC Premier Li Peng Warns Taiwan (1993)
  • The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China (1993)
  • Deng Xiaoping “One Country, Two Systems” (1984)
  • Deng Yingchao to Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (1983)
  • Deng Xiaoping “An Idea for the Peaceful Reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan" (1983)   ​
  • ​Chairman Ye Jianying's Elaborations on Policy Concerning Return of Taiwan to Motherland and Peaceful Reunification (1981)  
  • Message to Compatriots in Taiwan (1979)

Republic of China (ROC Taiwan) on the Use of Force

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We must solemnly point out the Republic of China does not succumb to military threat of any kind. Armed forces or military threat can not solve any problem; rather it creates more problems.
-- Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)
​(2000)


ROC Statements on the Use of Force and Peace

  • China's military deployments reflect its rising military might: expert, Focus Taiwan News Channel, (October 17, 2017)
  • Ma Mentioned Missiles to Xi (2015)
  • Chinese missiles remain threat to Taiwan: ministry (2015)
  • The Republic of China’s Mainland Policy:Piloting Cross-Strait Relations to Create a Peaceful Environment for Benign Interaction between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait (2012)
  • MND: China aiming 200 more missiles at Taiwan (2012)
  • Maintaining peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations is in the best interests of both sides (2012)
  • The ROC government's steady promotion of developments in cross-strait relations and the breadth of vision and mind of President Ma's Mainland policy are the keys to peace in the Taiwan Strait (2012)
  • Mainland China's Military Development and Taiwan's Countermeasures (2011)
  • Office of the President welcomes mainland Chinese leader Wen Jiabao's statement that missiles aimed at Taiwan will eventually be withdrawn (2010)
  • Minister Lai emphasizes that missile withdrawal should be a matter of action by the Mainland, and not for "talks." She calls on the Mainland to abandon its policy and thinking of using military force against Taiwan so that the two sides can lay a foundation for lasting peace and mutual trust (August 05, 2010)
  • “One Law, Two Communiqués”: The Shackle Enchaining the Destiny of the Taiwanese People (2008)
  • Chen Ming-tong warns that the Chinese authorities should face up to the results of the two referendums on joining and returning to the United Nations with a calm and ordinary attitude and not take reckless action! (2008)
  • Address by MAC Chairman Chen Ming-tong at the 2008 New Year's Press Conference (2008)
  • ​President Ma's Inaugural Address: Taiwan's Renaissance (2008)
  • President Chen's Remarks at Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Spring Festival​ (2006)
  • Chen’s Remarks to NSC (2006)
  • President Chen's Opening Remarks at National Security Conference​ (2006)
  • Chen Frankfurter Allgemeine Interview (2006)
  • President Chen Washington Post Interview (2006)
  • MAC Press Release on NUC II (2006)
  • President Chen Interviewed by Le Figaro (April 18, 2006)
  • Chen Washington Post Interview (March 13, 2006)
  • Missile buildup is accelerating: MND (March 08, 2006)
  • President Chen Shui-bian's New Year's Day Message and the Development of Cross-strait Relations (January 01, 2006)
  • Chen Updates Cross-Straits “Guidelines” (August 07, 2005)
  • President Chen Makes a Seven-Point Statement at the Conclusion of a Joint Meeting Responding to New Developments of Cross-Strait Political and Economic Affairs​ (April 09, 2005)
  • Democracy and peace to answer China's war authorization law (March 24, 2005)
  • President Chen's New Year's Day Address ( excerpt : cross-strait relations ) (January 01, 2005)
  • Chen Chi-mai: China is the primary source of instability in the Asia-Pacific region (December 29, 2004)​
  • GIO Minister Lin Chia-lung presides over a second Meet the Foreign Press event at which three high-ranking government officials discuss defense procurement and national security with the international media (October 19, 2004)
  • ​President Chen's Address to the National Day Rally (October 10, 2004)
  • President Chen's National Day Message (October 10, 2004)
  • President Chen's Inaugural Speech "Paving the Way for a Sustainable Taiwan" (May 20, 2004)
  • National Defensive Referendum (2003)​
  • President Chen on "One Country on Each Side" (August 03, 2002)
  • ​President Chen's Address to the CSIS Taipei Roundtable (March 26, 2002)
  • President Chen's New Year Message ( excerpt : cross-strait relations) (January 01, 2002) 
  • President Chen Shui-bian's Third Press Conference ( excerpt : cross-strait relations) (September 06, 2000) ​
  • President Chen's 520 Inaugural Speech:Taiwan Stands Up:Advancing to an Uplifting Era (excerpt) (May 20, 2000)
  • How We View Beijing's White Paper MAC Chairman Su Chi at the February 25, 2000 Press Conference (2000)
  • Analysis on Hong Kong Media Reports of Military Threat from Mainland China (2000)
  • Will the Republic of China Participate in the Theater Missile Defense? (1999)
  • Lee Teng-hui: "Special State-to-State" Relations (1999)
  • Lee Teng-hui: Remarks to National Unification Council (1999)
  • Consensus Formed at the National Development Conference on Cross-Strait Relations (Excerpt on the use of force) (1996)
  • President Lee Teng-hui: Inaugural Address (1996)
  • President Lee Teng-hui: Cornell Commencement Address (1995)​
  • President Lee Teng-hui: Address to the National Unification Council (1995)
  • Taiwan White Paper on Relations across the Taiwan Straits (1994)
  • Relations Across The Taiwan Straits (Excerpt "The Evolution of Peking's Taiwan Policy" )(1994)
  • Relations Across The Taiwan Straits (Excerpt "The ROC Government's Principles for Handling Cross-Strait Relations")(1994)
  • President Lee Teng-hui: Inaugural Address (1990)
  • ROC-U.S. Joint Communiqué (1958)
  • Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC (1954)

The United States of America on the Use of Force

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It is the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
-- 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)
Section 2 (b)(6)


  • The Promise of the Taiwan Relations Act (March 2014)
  • Kurt M. Campbell Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (October 2011)
  • H.R. 2918 Taiwan Policy Act of 2011 (September 2011)
  • Remarks by Joseph Donovan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State at the CSIS/Brookings Symposium: Mid Term Assessment of the Policies of the Ma Ying-jeou Administration (2010)
  • Cross-Strait Relations in a New Era of Negotiations (July 2010)
  • U.S.-China Joint Statement (November 2009)
  • H.Con.Res.219 - Expressing the sense of Congress regarding enhanced security for Taiwan (July 2005)
  • Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility? (2005)
  • Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan (2004)
  • Public Law 107-228 (H.R. 1646) (2002) 
  • H.R.1646 Foreign Relations Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2003 (Sec. 692, 1206, 1263)  ((Introduced) April 2001) ​
  • Clinton Resolution with Assent of Taiwan's People (2000)
  • H.R. 1838 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act ((As placed on Calendar Senate) April 2000)
  • Amendment to H.R. 2415 - American Embassy Security Act (July 1999)
  • Presidents Clinton and Jiang at APEC Meeting (1999)
  • H.R.1838 Taiwan Security Enhancement Act ((Introduced) May 1999)
  • Report to Congress on the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (February 1999)
  • US Resolution Expressing the United State's Continued Support for Taiwan (July 1998)
  • Summit and Clinton's Statement on the "Three Noes" (June 1998)
  • H.R. Con. Res. 270 Acknowledging the positive role of Taiwan in the current Asian financial crisis and affirming the support of the American people for peace and stability on the Taiwan Strait and security for Taiwan's democracy ((Introduced) April 1998)
  • U.S.-Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act (1997)
  • Secretary of State Christopher on Improving Relations with China (1996)
  • U.S. Department of State on March 1996 Taiwan Strait Tensions (1996)
  • US Taiwan Policy Review II (1994)
  • Public Law 103-236 [H.R. 2333] (Exercept) (1994)
  • ​Message from President Reagan to Taiwan President (1982)
  • Statement by George H. W. Bush in Beijing (1989)
  • Public Law 96-8 Taiwan Relations Act (1979)
  • Nixon's Five Points (1972)
  • "Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore Islands" (1958)
  • ROC-U.S. Joint Communiqué (1958)
  • U.S. Secretary of State Dulles' Statement (1958)
  • The US Congress Formosa Resolution (1955)
  • Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC (1954)
  • President Truman's Statement on the Mission of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Area (1950)

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Copyright © 2018 The East Asia Peace & Security Initiative. All Rights Reserved. 
  • Welcome
  • E-Books
    • Strait Talk >
      • Chapter 1: Historical, Cultural, Legal, and Geographical Factors
      • Chapter 2: The Political Factor
      • Chapter 3: The Economic Factor
      • Chapter 4: The Military Factor
      • Chapter 5: The Issues
      • Chapter 6: The Negotiations
      • Chapter 7: Conclusions
      • Appendices
      • Images
    • An Analysis of China's National Interests
    • One China, Five Interpretations
  • Blogs
  • Cross-Strait Info
    • Cross-Strait Timeline >
      • 2018-2019
      • 2016-2017
      • 2000-2015
      • 1980-1999
      • 1950-1979
      • 1911-1949
      • pre 1911
    • Official Documents >
      • Official Documents Library
      • 中国人民共和国​
      • 中華民國 (台湾)
    • Major Actors >
      • PRC
      • ROC
      • US
      • Japan
    • Military Balance
    • Political Warfare
    • Key Issues >
      • 1992 Consensus
      • Anti-Secession Law
      • One China
      • 'One Country, Two Systems'
      • Status Quo
      • Taiwan Independence
      • Taiwan Strait Crises
      • U.S. Arms Sales
      • Use of Force
    • Cooperation >
      • ROC
      • PRC
      • Signed Agreements
      • Cross-Strait Links
      • Peace Proposal
      • Military Talks
    • Glossary
    • Additional Resources on Cross-Strait Relations >
      • Books
      • Reports, Articles & Interviews
      • Multimedia
  • Photos
    • A Photographic Journey Through Old China