STATUS QUO

The different parties within Taiwan each have a different idea of what status quo means. One definition goes back to the 1992 consensus which allowed each side to interpret the meaning of “one China” and maintain the political separation as conditions for unification evolve. Another definition has been labeled “dynamic status quo” which meant that there would be no change in the political relationship between the two sides, but that Taiwan would be allowed to evolve its culture (create its identity) and political arrangements which would in the long-run make independence a more likely outcome. This definition also assumes the current de facto status quo would be continued forever as independence. The third definition, offered by James Soong, leader of the PFP, is “parallel movement” to allow future generations to reach a peaceful decision. He stated that Taiwan couldn’t change China’s leaders, but that they could wait for China to change in a more democratic direction. He used the analogy that Taiwan should get engaged to China, but not married. It would be a long engagement; as many as 40 years. In any case he saw major social and political change on both sides of the Strait and he believed Taiwan should wait until the two sides are closer together before any decisions are made.

Strait Talk, Chapter Five: The Issues

Background on the Status Quo

According to EAPASI's e-book titled Strait Talk, there are three definitions of the status quo concept: the 1992 “Consensus” status quo; the “Dynamic” status quo; and the “Parallel Movement” status quo and, as a result, there are four status quo policies.

The first definition is the "Consensus" status quo. The “Consensus” status quo refers to the negotiated settlement reached between the Communist Party of China (CPC) of China and the Kuomintang (KMT) on Taiwan. It originates from the agreement proposed by the KMT in 1992 to identify a framework to develop the cross-strait relationship. Both the KMT and the CPC refer to it as the "1992 Consensus". The KMT interprets the "Consensus" status quo to mean that China and Taiwan can maintain different interpretations of the meaning of ‘one China’.

In contrast, China perceives that the “Consensus” status quo means a commitment to China’s interpretation of the concept of ‘one China’, which is the “One China Principle”. China wants Taiwan, especially the current President Tsai Ying-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to accept its interpretation of the “Consensus” status quo by verbalizing the phrase “1992 Consensus”, which President Tsai refuses to do.

The second definition is the “Dynamic” status quo.  China, Taiwan's KMT and DPP maintain different interpretations of what should occur under the “Dynamic” status quo.   The DPP actively implements a "Dynamic” status quo which means it pursues policies that strengthen what it perceives is Taiwan’s yet-to-be-completely institutionalized status as a sovereign and independent state. Their different interpretations tend to result in cross-strait tensions particularly when the DPP is in power, as it is now.

The third definition is “Parallel Movement” status quo. “Parallel Movement” means future generations on each side of the strait could reach a peaceful resolution concerning the nature and scope of China-Taiwan relations.
The U.S., China, as well as Taiwan's KMT and DPP hold different positions on what happens under this form of status quo.  The U.S. maintains a "Parallel Movement" status quo policy which means both sides of the strait must avoid taking unilateral actions and making statements that alter the existing status quo in cross-strait relations. This means China cannot resort to the use of force to solve issues with Taiwan, while Taiwan cannot introduce policies that support forces of Taiwanese independence.

Implications for the Cross-Strait Relationship

China wants Taiwan to accept its interpretation of the “Consensus” status quo by verbalizing the phrase “1992 Consensus”. Since taking political power on Taiwan in 2016, President Tsai Ying-wen's administration (DPP) and China have actively pursued policies that support their respective interpretations of the status quo. The Tsai administration refuses to say the phrase "1992 Consensus" while enacting policies that strengthen Taiwan's political separation from China indefinitely, as well as the Taiwanese national identity. As a result, China has campaigned to suppress Taiwan in the international arena, including poaching Taiwan's diplomatic allies, as well as blocking international activities such as participating in international organizations like the ICAO and WHA. In addition, China continues to use political warfare military actions to coerce the Tsai administration to accept the "Consensus" status quo, which include an unprecedented number of military events around Taiwan. It is not likely that tensions in the cross-strait relationship will lower, unless the Tsai administration acknowledges the "Consensus" status quo and abandons the "Dynamic" status quo. The U.S. needs to maintain a commitment to upholding the "Parallel Movement" status quo, or the U.S. could risk compelling China to take unilateral action to enforce the "Consensus" status quo or encouraging Taiwan's DPP to strengthen the "Dynamic" status quo and move toward formal independence.