Cross-Strait Terms
The Cross-Strait Terms is an emerging authoritative tool for a wide audience from policymakers and scholars to journalists and educated readers to students
in undergraduate and graduate courses. It covers a range of terms that are some times confused or not used correctly. The Cross-Strait Terms is produced independently by the East Asia Peace & Security Initiative (EAPASI) and is a work in progress.
in undergraduate and graduate courses. It covers a range of terms that are some times confused or not used correctly. The Cross-Strait Terms is produced independently by the East Asia Peace & Security Initiative (EAPASI) and is a work in progress.
Taiwan-China: Unification
Taiwan perceives the Taiwan-China relationship in terms of “unification”. From both the KMT and DPP's viewpoint, this means the two sides are historically separated entities working toward becoming a single entity at some point in the future. The KMT wants to unify with the PRC in accordance with the system of democracy as it is practiced on Taiwan.
China-Taiwan: Reunification
The PRC perceives China-Taiwan relationship in terms of "reunification". This indicates that Taiwan is part of the PRC. The PRC wants to reunify peacefully with Taiwan in accordance with the ‘one country two system’ formula, which relegates Taiwan to the role of a special administrative region within the communist system. Under this system the CPC will maintain the role of national authorities while the KMT and other political parties on Taiwan such as the DPP will assume the role of local authorities.
One China (一个中国)
The concept of ‘one China’ is the long-standing framework guiding relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China ((ROC) Taiwan), and the United States of America (U.S.). Our research shows there are five different interpretations of the concept: The PRC has two; the U.S. has two; and Taiwan has one. Taiwan’s DPP wants to abandon the concept all together.
One China Policy 一个中国政策
The U.S. follows the “One China Policy” (一个中国政策 / 一个中国的政策). The Policy is based on informal and formal institutions that serve as the basis for U.S.-China relations and U.S.-Taiwan relations. Our research shows that it consists of two different frameworks – the communiqués framework and the second framework. The communiqués framework consists of the three U.S.-PRC joint communiqués (1972, 1979, and 1982). It undergirds both U.S.-China relations, as well as U.S.-Taiwan relations. But U.S.-Taiwan relations are also based on a second framework consisting of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Six Assurances (1982), and Reagan’s Secret Memorandum on the 1982 Communiqué. Both frameworks support the peaceful settlement of the cross-strait issue. But not only do they contain contradictions that build mistrust into the trilateral relationship but also the second framework provides political and military recognition to Taiwan through arms sales as well as a deterrence guarantee.
According to our research, China wants the U.S. to follow a “One China Policy” consisting of only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports (三不支持). The Three Non-supports or the Three No’s are: no support for “two Chinas”; “one China, one Taiwan”; and “membership to international organizations that require statehood”. China actively opposes the second framework that directs US-Taiwan relations in large part because the TRA and the Six Assurances grant recognition to the Taiwanese authorities while denying Chinese sovereignty claims over Taiwan.
According to our research, China wants the U.S. to follow a “One China Policy” consisting of only the communiqué framework and the Three Non-supports (三不支持). The Three Non-supports or the Three No’s are: no support for “two Chinas”; “one China, one Taiwan”; and “membership to international organizations that require statehood”. China actively opposes the second framework that directs US-Taiwan relations in large part because the TRA and the Six Assurances grant recognition to the Taiwanese authorities while denying Chinese sovereignty claims over Taiwan.
One China Principle 一个中国原则
The Communist Party of China (CPC) designed the “One China Principle” (一个中国原则 / 一个中国的原则) as its Taiwan reunification strategy. The Chinese Principle’s foundation is the official position of the CPC that the ‘government of the PRC is the sole legitimate government of China and there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China’. On this basis, it created the formula of “peaceful reunification; one country, two systems” (和平统一、一国两制). The formula contains the process, such as people-to-people exchanges and economic integration, as well as the final outcome of reunification, namely the implementation of a modified version of “one country, two systems” in which the CPC demotes Taiwan to a special administrative region of China. The Principle also contains the method of reunification: through means of peace or force, with an emphasis on the former and a reluctance to drop the latter, which is directed at Taiwan independence forces on and off the island as well as foreign forces, namely the U.S. The leadership’s commitment to a peaceful settlement is evidenced by its restraint to not liberate Taiwan or even the islands adjacent to China’s coast (e.g., Jinmen and Matsu) by force for decades.
1992 Consensus 九二共識 /九二共识
The 1992 Consensus (92 Consensus) (九二共識 /九二共识) represents different things to China and Taiwan's KMT. For China, the 1992 Consensus represents the One China Principle, and it is the basis for political talks on “reunification”. For Taiwan’s KMT political party, the 92 Consensus represents the “one China, two interpretations”. For Taiwan’s DPP political party, the 92 Consensus represents the “One China Principle” and its attendant concepts so it rejects the Consensus. The U.S. has no interpretation of the concept but Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s testimony before the U.S. Congress acknowledges the concept.
China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Status Quo
Our research shows that, similar to the concept of ‘one China’, the Status Quo has many interpretations. There are three broad definitions: the consensus status quo based on the 1992 Consensus; the dynamic status quo; and the parallel movement status quo.
China adheres to a consensus status quo policy based on the “One China Principle”, which aims to reunify China and Taiwan through means of peace or force in accordance with the political formula of ‘one country, two systems’.
Taiwan has two different interpretations of the status quo. The KMT adheres to a consensus status quo policy that differs from the PRC. It wants to unify the two sides under a system of democracy, not the ‘one country, two systems’ formula. In contrast, the DPP follows a dynamic status quo policy. This policy aims to strengthen the status of the Second Republic, which holds that Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country; it also aims to create a New Republic which institutionalizes the standing of the Second Republic through a title change and a rewrite of the constitution.
The U.S. follows a policy of parallel movement status quo. “Parallel Movement” means future generations on each side of the strait could reach a peaceful decision regarding the status of the relationship. China, Taiwan, and the U.S. all have different interpretations of the parallel movement status quo. But for the U.S., it means that neither side of the Taiwan Strait can take unilateral action that alters the current status of the cross-strait relationship such as resorting to the use of force to resolve issues (PRC), as well as declaring independence (DPP).
China adheres to a consensus status quo policy based on the “One China Principle”, which aims to reunify China and Taiwan through means of peace or force in accordance with the political formula of ‘one country, two systems’.
Taiwan has two different interpretations of the status quo. The KMT adheres to a consensus status quo policy that differs from the PRC. It wants to unify the two sides under a system of democracy, not the ‘one country, two systems’ formula. In contrast, the DPP follows a dynamic status quo policy. This policy aims to strengthen the status of the Second Republic, which holds that Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country; it also aims to create a New Republic which institutionalizes the standing of the Second Republic through a title change and a rewrite of the constitution.
The U.S. follows a policy of parallel movement status quo. “Parallel Movement” means future generations on each side of the strait could reach a peaceful decision regarding the status of the relationship. China, Taiwan, and the U.S. all have different interpretations of the parallel movement status quo. But for the U.S., it means that neither side of the Taiwan Strait can take unilateral action that alters the current status of the cross-strait relationship such as resorting to the use of force to resolve issues (PRC), as well as declaring independence (DPP).
China-Taiwan: One China Framework 一个中国框架
The CPC introduced the ‘One China Framework’ in order to define the vague concept of the 1992 Consensus. The basis of the “Framework” is the “One China Principle”. The primary goal is to advance political discussions on reunification / unification and to deepen political trust across the strait.
Taiwan-China: Broad One China Framework 大一中框架
The “Broad One China Framework” is a counter proposal to the “One China Framework”. Retired KMT officials as well as DPP officials proposed the framework. It consists of five principles, including “respecting the present ‘status quo’ and not changing it unilaterally”. From their viewpoint, the status quo means the ROC and the PRC “have coexisted since 1949, with bilateral relations seeing a gradual transformation from “fighting with each other” to “governing separately”. The primary driver for proposing the Broad One-China Framework is to establish two international legal entities consisting of the ROC and the PRC. The establishment of the two legal entities is directed at “resolving issues through consensus” and serves “as an interim scheme”. In accordance with the principles of the framework, the two sides should “strive to eliminate hostility”; “work together to maintain peace and safety in the region”; and, “promise not to use military force or sign any military agreement that is unfavorable to the other side”. In addition, both sides should be allowed to “join international organizations” as well as “establish normal state relations with other countries”.
Taiwan-China: Peace and Stability Framework
During the Chen Shui-bian administration, the DPP government proposed that the two sides of the strait promote and base cross-strait interactions on a peace and stability framework (instead of basing cross-strait relations on other concepts that represent China’s “One China Principle” such as the 1992 Consensus). The Tsai Ying-wen administration also promotes this framework as the basis for cross-strait interactions.
Taiwan Consensus 台湾共识 /台灣共識
During her first unsuccessful presidential bid, Tsai Ying-wen proposed that the Taiwan Consensus replace the 1992 Consensus. It would serve as the framework of Taiwan’s China policies and “would be consistent and unaffected by regime change” on the island. It is possible Tsai envision the Taiwan Consensus would replace the 1992 Consensus.
Three Non-Supports 三不支持 |
Three Noes |
According to the 2011 CRS report titled "China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei", in August 1995 President Clinton reportedly sent a secret letter to PRC President Jiang Zemin. In the letter Clinton stated that the U.S. would: (1) “oppose” Taiwan independence; (2) would not support “two Chinas” or one China and one Taiwan; and (3) would not support Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations. At the 1997 Clinton-Jiang Summit, Clinton and Jiang issued a joint statement that expressed U.S. support for the "One China Policy", including the three U.S.-China joint communiques. Several days later, a State Department spokesperson reinforced that position and added the "Three Noes". The spokesperson stated, the U.S. "made clear that we have a one-China policy; that we don’t support a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. We don’t support a two-China policy. We don’t support Taiwan independence, and we don’t support Taiwanese membership in organizations that require you to be a member state.” Furthermore, at a summit in June 1998 in China, Clinton stated that he reaffirmed the U.S.'s Taiwan policy, specifically that the U.S. does not "support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China" and the U.S. does not support Taiwan's membership "in any organization for which statehood is a requirement". These are known as the "Three Non-Supports" or the "Three Noes".