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EAPASI's research shows that more attention is given to areas of conflict across the Taiwan Strait. But equal attention should be paid to the areas of cooperation. Starting in 2005, for example, the PRC's Communist Party of China (CPC) and Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalists) established party-to-party relations to establish the basis to build and advance the cross-strait relationship. When the KMT came in to political power in 2008, the Ma Ying-jeou administration and the Hu Jintao and XiJinping administrations worked to reduce cross-strait tensions by relaxing restrictions on trade, investment, and travel as well as advancing people-to-people exchanges. The cross-strait economic and cultural cooperation resulted in Economic Cooperation Agreement Framework (ECFA) while talks ultimately led to an unprecedented meeting in 2015 in Singapore between Presidents Xi and Ma.
But cross-strait cooperation is contingent upon at least two factors: the objectives of the KMT leader who is elected president; and which political party holds power on Taiwan. In the case of the former, during President Lee Teng-hui's tenure, cross-strait relations were prone to pockets of instability because he tried to gain political recognition of the ROC from the PRC. In the case of the latter, the KMT typically brings peace and stability to the cross-strait relationship because it does not have an active independence agenda. In contrast, the DPP tends to bring tensions into the cross-strait dynamic because, and this depends on the leader at the time, it brings varying degrees of instability to the relationship in large part due to its promotion of a "Dynamic" status quo policy that supports Taiwan independence. |
Cooperation Across the Taiwan Strait |
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According to EAPASI research, More attention is given to areas of conflict across the Taiwan Strait, but equal attention should be paid to the areas of cooperation. Over the past eight years, for example, the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalists) worked to reduce cross-strait tensions by relaxing restrictions on trade, investment, and travel as well as people-to-people exchanges. The CPC established the official Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and the semi-official Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), while the ROC side established the official Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to manage cross-strait affairs. These institutions engaged in consultations in order to build the cross-strait relationship.
Between 2008 and 2016 the two sides engaged in unprecedented levels of cooperation on the economic plane and, to a lesser extent, on the political plane. For instance, the officials from ARATS and SEF held 11 rounds of consultations, leading to the signing of 23 agreements, as well as the issuance of 2 Consensuses and 3 Common Opinions. Most notably, in 2010 the officials completed years-long negotiations for the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). ECFA is a major trade arrangement that aims to reduce gradually and/or eliminate eventually barriers to trade and investment. Pursuant to the guidelines of the ECFA, the officials created the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC) to manage the agreement. In addition to the economic cooperation, in 2014 and 2015 two major breakthroughs occurred in the political realm. In 2014 the then head of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) visited the mainland. His visit was the first high level government-to-government contact between China and Taiwan since 1949. In 2015 the Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou met in Singapore. The meeting was the first ever between the two highest ranking leaders from both sides of the Taiwan Strait. For nearly eight years the cross-strait relationship entered into a new era characterized by cooperation and stability. As we wrote prior to the elections, the 2016 elections of the main opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to the Office of the President as well as the Legislative Yuan indicate that a shift will occur in the cross-strait relationship. As for the economic realm, the DPP most likely will aim to constrain the growing dependency of the Taiwanese economy upon the mainland's. As for the political realm, the administration most likely will avoid engaging in political talks on unification / reunification in accordance with the PRC's One China Principle. Instead, it might work to establish common ground that allows for the political recognition of the ROC by the PRC. During the first term, the Tsai administration might work to stabilize cross-strait affairs but avoid verbalizing the "1992 Consensus", which represents the concept of "One China Different Interpretations" and serves as the basis of cross-strait cooperation for between the KMT and the PRC-CPC. To date, the Tsai administration has yet to publicly say the phrase "1992 Consensus" and has yet to establish a new framework outside of the concepts representing 'one China' to guide the cross-strait relationship. In the meantime, the KMT will continue to cooperate with the CPC through party-to-party ties in order to maintain robust ties, while the PRC will work with areas on Taiwan that accept the 92 Consensus, and it will actively implement measures that bypass the Tsai administration but encourage cross-strait cooperation, such as the 31 Measures. If the Tsai administration receives a mandate for a second term from the people, it most likely will continue to push for a new framework for the cross-strait relationship. One framework could be the peace and stability framework. This framework is not associated with the PRC's One China Principle and attendant concept such as the "1992 Consensus" but it promotes cross-strait cooperation including economic cooperation and cultural exchanges. The 2016 election of the DPP to power signals a new era in the cross-strait relationship that some observers label a 'cold peace". To date it has resulted in less cooperation and more conflict, which has led to the emergence of several battlegrounds over the concept of 'one China'. |