Table of Contents CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, LEGAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS INTRODUCTION Unification versus Independence HISTORY Prior to 1895 1895-1945 The Chinese Civil War 1945-Present SUMMARY CULTURE The Great Tradition The Lesser Tradition The New Taiwanese Culture SUMMARY GEOGRAPHY Physical Geography Economic Location Strategic Location Geographic Size SUMMARY THE LAW Judicial System Compatibility Court system Constitution compatibility China’s Laws Regulating Contact Taiwan’s Laws Regulating Contact International Law Sovereignty Territorial Integrity Internal self-identification External Acceptance SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER TWO: THE POLITICAL FACTOR INTRODUCTION POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY What are Human Rights? Individual Liberty China Taiwan Popular Sovereignty POLITICAL PROCESSES Taiwan Expanding the Franchise Checks and Balances Institutional Media China Expanding the Franchise Student Demands Grassroots elections Checks and Balances Institutional Media EXTERNAL INFLUENCES China Taiwan CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER THREE: THE ECONOMIC FACTOR INTRODUCTION IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES China Taiwan CROSS STRAIT ECONOMIC ACTIVITY General Cross Strait Travel and Communication Cross Strait Investment Cross Strait Trade Business Environment in China CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER FOUR: THE MILITARY FACTOR INTRODUCTION EVENTS WITH IMPACT ON MILITARY CONFRONTATION Tiananmen – June 4, 1989 Cold War End – Fall 1989 The Gulf War – January-February 1991 Diplomatic Exchange with South Korea – August 1992 US Opposition to China Hosting 2000 Olympics - Fall 1993 Lee Denghui Visit to Cornell – June 8-11, 1995 Japan-US Declaration on Security – April 17, 1996 North Korean Missile Firing across Japan – August 31, 1998 Operation Allied Force – NATO in Kosovo – March 24, 1999 – June 10, 1999 Bombing of Chinese Belgrade Embassy by US – May 7, 1999 Afghanistan War on Terror – October 7, 2001 Entry into World Trade Organization – China – November 10, 2001 and Taiwan – January 1, 2002 Spratly Islands Issue Settled – November 4, 2002 Liberation of Iraq by Coalition Forces – Spring, 2003 CROSS STRAIT CONFRONTATION HISTORY 1948-1953 The First Cross Strait Crisis of 1954-1955 and the U.S. – Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the ROC The Second Cross Strait Crisis of 1958 The Third Cross Strait Crisis in 1962 A Quiet Period 1962-1994 The 1995 – 1996 Cross Strait Missile Crisis The EP-3 Reconnaissance Plane Incident – April 2000 MILITARY POTENTIAL Threat Perceptions China Taiwan United States Military Strategy and Doctrine China Taiwan United States Budget Force Structure and Weapons/Equipment Military Modernization and Arms Acquisition China Taiwan U.S.-China Relations POLITICAL WARFARE WAR FIGHTING SCENARIOS MILITARY EXERCISES/DEPLOYMENTS CONFRONTATION SOLUTIONS CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER FIVE: THE ISSUES INTRODUCTION CHINA’S ISSUES China’s Issues with Taiwan Taiwan’s Legal Status Degree of Autonomy for Taiwan after Settlement Role of US Recognition of China China’s Blueprint for the Future The Hong Kong Precedent Jiang Zemin’s Eight Points for Unification Taiwan’s Movement toward Independence Status Quo The Taiwanization Process Taiwan's Referendums Taiwan’s Participation in International Organizations SUMMARY China’s Issues with the United States Violation of Communiqués Perceived Congressional Political Support for Taiwan Independence Arms Sales to Taiwan Other Issues TAIWAN’S ISSUES Taiwan’s Issues with China One China Status of Negotiating Parties Use of Force Taiwan’s Approach to Negotiations UNITED STATES' ISSUES USEFUL PRECEDENTS CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER SIX: THE NEGOTIATIONS INTRODUCTION THE STRUCTURES China Taiwan THE PROCESS CONCLUSIONS CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS INTRODUCTION REVIEW OF INFLUENCING FACTORS History Culture Geography Law Political Economics Military The Seven Factors THE ISSUES THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOLUTION

CHAPTER ONE HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, LEGAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesion. Throughout its history, foreign invasions and internal strife have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation from the motherland for nearly 30.years has been artificial and against our national interests and aspirations and this state of affairs must not be allowed to continue. Ye Jianying – Message to Taiwan Compatriots 1979 The large majority of the people on the island (85 percent) do not consider themselves Chinese but Taiwanese. They have their own language, culture, and history, and are as distinct from the Chinese as the Americans are distinct from the British. Taiwan Independence Advocates Website 2002 (Website no longer active) INTRODUCTION Unification versus Independence The central issue of this book is whether Taiwan will be unified with China, whether it will become an independent state or whether the final solution will be some form of confederation system between the extremes. China claims that Taiwan is part of China and must be politically incorporated into the Chinese state. Citizens of Taiwan are not unified in their view of Taiwan’s future. Some believe Taiwan has evolved into a new and separate sovereign state and should seek independence from China under the principle of self-determination. Others think that Taiwan should be unified with China, but that conditions must change to make the two sides more compatible before unification. Four broad factors (history, culture, geography and law) have had an influence on decision- making about the cross strait problem. They have generally been given less weight than political, economic and security factors, but they still emerge as part of the rationale that is often used in the independence versus unification debate. In most cases these factors have been invoked to support justification for Taiwan independence or as a basis for China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China. The first three are not factors which provide impetus for movement toward either unification or independence. The law factor helps to establish an environment in which movement can take place. Political, economic and military factors, discussed in the following chapters, provide the drive for change. HISTORY The key historical question is the degree to which Taiwan has been under the control of China. Taiwan independence advocates suggest that Chinese political control has never been sufficient to support a claim, based on history, that Taiwan should be considered a part of China. Unification advocates, on the other hand, maintain that Taiwan has been a part of China from earliest times. Official histories vary depending on the historian. This section will outline some of the claims. Prior to 1895 Early history on the Taiwan independence website suggests that “the most comprehensive historical records on Taiwan go back some 350 years, to the period of the Dutch occupation, 1624- 1662. When the Dutch East Indies Company arrived, they found only the aborigine population on the island: there were no signs of any administrative structure of the Chinese Imperial Government. Thus, at that time Taiwan was not part of China. 1 Most scholars agree that most of the original inhabitants of Taiwan were from the Malayan- Polynesian family in Indonesia. Some Chinese and Japanese archaeologists, however, have found that the prehistoric Stone Age people were Eolithic and many items (painted red pottery, red polished pottery, chipped stone knives, polished saddle-shaped rectangular and leaf-shaped stone knives, black pottery, pottery tripods, incised designs of pottery decoration, stone halberds, bone arrowheads, bone spearheads, cord-impressed pottery and the comb-technique of pottery decoration) that have been found in archaeological digs are connected with the early Chinese mainland culture.2Another find of prehistoric human skeletons, near Taipei, discovered that the upper lateral incisors, and the canine teeth, had been removed during youth; a characteristic of part of early Chinese culture. Dr. Hsieh Chiaomin concluded that “the culture of the aborigines in the northern and central parts of Taiwan is related to that of the Chinese mainland, while that of the southern and eastern parts is related to the South Sea Islands’ culture.”3 China’s official history suggests that large expeditions of over 10,000 men were sent to Taiwan by the State of Wu in the Three Kingdoms dynasty in the 3rd Century AD and by the Sui dynasty in the 7th Century AD.4Chinese records also mention setting up an administrative outpost on the Penghu Islands to administer Taiwan during the Song dynasty in the 12th Century AD. Given the difficulty of travel and communication during the early period it is not surprising that the Dutch found no administrative organization in Taiwan when they arrived in the 16 t h Century. The Taiwanese account says that the first “Taiwanese” were actually Chinese brought to Taiwan by the Dutch as forced labor who married aborigines and stayed there. The Chinese account doesn’t mention this group of immigrants. Both sides generally agree though that the Chinese settlement of Taiwan did not really begin until a sea-faring pirate working out of Fujian province, Zheng Chenggong (郑成功)(known as Koxinga in the West), a loyalist of the Ming dynasty, was chased out of the mainland by Qing dynasty troops and fled with his army to Taiwan in 1662.5When he arrived in Taiwan he defeated the Dutch colonialists and actually signed an agreement with the Dutch on February 1, 1662 allowing them to withdraw. Zheng's new administration was a government in exile that hoped to someday return to China and throw out the Manchus who were considered barbarians. Zheng’s government in exile had characteristics similar to that of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. The Chinese account of Zheng fails to mention that he was a Ming loyalist escaping Chinese Qing control and takes credit for the period of his occupation of Taiwan. Zheng and his son and grandson after he died, maintained control until 1683 when they were finally defeated by Qing dynasty troops. There is disagreement about how much control the Qing dynasty exercised over the island during the 212 years between 1683 and 1895. Chinese records describe official efforts to map the area and establish the area as a prefecture of Fujian province, calling it Taiwan (terraced bay), in 1727. According to Chinese records, by 1887 Taiwan was made a full province of China with 11 counties and 5 cantons. General Liu Minchuan (劉銘傳) was sent to be the first governor. He began to lay railways, open mines, establish telegraph and postal services, build merchant ships, start industries and set up new-style schools. These efforts stimulated a period of strong economic growth.6Taiwan independence advocates argue that there was no real control during that period and that the Taiwanese people were in constant rebellion. They note the saying that there were “uprisings every three years and rebellions every five years.”7The Taiwanese account does mention numerous clashes with Qing officials which is tacit recognition that there was some political control, albeit loose, taking place. Most of the 212-year period can be characterized as one of lawlessness and violent struggle in Taiwan. Not only did the foreign powers (Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese and later French) fight among themselves, they also fought against indigenous residents (aborigines, Fujianese, Cantonese, Hakka) who were in turn fighting among themselves.8First Zheng, then the foreigners,brought in laborers from China. Many intermarried with aborigines and did in fact stay. In addition there were a number of pirates operating out of Taiwan who were not associated with any group. Even the Qing government was unable to exercise total control over the island after it defeated Zheng Chenggong. The pirates and other outlaws in and along the coast of Taiwan often attacked the foreign forces as well as the Qing administrators. When the foreign governments complained to the Qing Emperor he is reported, by Taiwan independence advocates, to have said “Taiwan is beyond our territory.”9Regardless of what the Emperor actually said, most historians agree that the Qing Emperor, in the last half of the 19th Century, did little to exercise his control over Taiwan, especially to protect foreigners. In fact, since much of this period coincided with the unstable period of the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion in China, when foreigners were carving up China in what has become known as the Period of Humiliation, it was unlikely that the Emperor would have offered to assist and protect foreigners, even if he could.10But during this period when numerous “unequal treaties” were forced on the Qing government, the Emperor was very weak and was more focused on survival of his own throne than on pirates in Taiwan. Many areas around China, besides Taiwan, were not under the strict administrative control of the Qing government. By 1893 the population in Taiwan exceeded 2.54 million people in 507,000 or more households, and economic progress was being made.11Agriculture and trade became major sources of support for the population and self-sufficiency looked possible. In fact, Taiwan was considered one of the most modern of Chinese provinces at the time. 1895 – 1945 The next 50 years of Taiwan’s history was a period of Japanese occupation. In 1895, the Japanese defeated the Qing military and the Chinese sued for peace.12After a period of political intrigue between China, Germany, France, and Russia, the Japanese forced the Treaty of Shimonoseki onto China. The treaty was focused on Korea, making it a Japanese protectorate, and the addition of four new treaty ports, including Chongqing, a port in the interior of China. It also included the ceding of Liaodong (Southern Manchuria), the Pescadores Islands (澎湖群島) (Penghu), and Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity.13 Japan’s initial focus in Taiwan was political consolidation. They at first met with a rebellion by the local residents who had set up an “Independent Republic of Taiwan.”14The native aborigines also resisted Japanese rule with a number of uprisings. In fact, throughout the Japanese period there were elements of the society that continued to work for an independent Taiwan.15 The Japanese, over time, took two major steps to consolidate their control. They introduced a disciplined and well-organized police system and they used the education system to assimilate the Taiwanese into the Japanese culture. By 1935 all the schools were teaching in Japanese and many Taiwanese began to identify more with Japan than with China. The young people were more interested in looking forward by following the successful Japanese modernization process than in looking backward at their Chinese historical heritage. They appreciated the efficiency of the Japanese administration as contrasted to historically inefficient Chinese administrations. During the period the Japanese invested heavily in infrastructure to facilitate economic activity. They developed harbors, hydropower stations, irrigation systems, highways and railroads, etc. Their intent was to provide agricultural products to Japan and to make Taiwan become a market for Japanese products. They also encouraged emigration from Japan to Taiwan because Japan was overcrowded, but that program was not particularly successful. By 1945, however, there were over 400,000 Japanese in Taiwan working mostly in the civil or military service, education, technical service and in industry. Few came from Japan to take up agriculture which stayed in the hands of the Taiwanese. The Taiwanese population at that time was a little over 6 million. Post secondary education for Taiwanese was primarily in Japan. During the period from 1915 to about 1935 Taiwanese students studying in Japan began to hear about Woodrow Wilson’s concepts of self-determination and they were eager to translate these new ideas into some form of “Home Rule Movement” for Taiwan. Young, bright Taiwanese students in Japan organized and began to pressure Japan for increased autonomy. They formed the Home Rule Association and published journals like the Formosan Magazine. The Japanese, however, suppressed the movement.16 By the time of the Japanese invasion of China in the mid-1930s most Taiwanese had been acculturated. They spoke Japanese as their educated language and even adopted Japanese names and cultural habits. Many became soldiers in the Japanese army and that became a serious problem for Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) troops who accepted rhe Japanese surrender in 1945. Throughout the period there was an undercurrent of resistance to Japanese rule and a strong tendency to create an independent Taiwanese state based upon human rights principles which were being defined by the League of Nations. The Japanese period ended when they were defeated in 1945. Prior to the surrender, the big powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia) had agreed, in Cairo, Potsdam and Yalta, to return Taiwan to China and at that time the Chinese authority in control was Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang; a formal ally during the war. The Japanese period caused the native inhabitants of Taiwan, mostly the descendents of those who entered Taiwan from Fujian and Guangdong in the 17th and 18th Centuries, to reflect on their future. They were compelled to regard Japan as the source of political authority, but throughout the period there were many young Taiwanese who sought ways to turn the island of Taiwan into an independent country. They believed China had abandoned them too easily in 1895. During the period some Chinese cultural habits were eroded as the Japanese educated them in Japanese values. The Chinese Civil War The Chinese Civil War between the communists and nationalists obviously has had and continues to have a profound impact on current thinking about the cross strait problem. Perhaps the single most important consequence of the civil war was to inculcate attitudes of mistrust and hatred between the military leaders of the two sides. This mutual distrust lingers from generation to generation of military leaders by being written into the studied military history and military doctrine. The history is made real by living participants who recount personal anecdotes of their experiences fighting the other side. It will take another twenty to thirty years before these participants are gone and the stories become second-hand and less personal. The communist movement began in July of 1921 when thirteen delegates representing 60 communist party members met secretly in a girls’ school in the French Concession in Shanghai.17Some of the delegates were students of Marxism recently returned from Europe and some, like Mao Zedong, were self-educated in Communism while working at other jobs in China. The commonality was a desire to rid China of warlords, foreign imperialism, and landlords. Nearly all young idealistic Chinese youths agreed that China must accomplish this cleansing and reunification, but they did not agree on how to accomplish it. At first the communists and nationalists (Kuomintang or KMT) cooperated in common hope and desperation. The leader considered to be the father of modern China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, reached an early agreement (January 1923) with a Soviet diplomat, Adolf Joffe, for Soviet support of his effort to consolidate China. Later that year the communists, numbering 300, decided to join forces with the Kuomintang to accomplish their principal task of reunifying China. The Soviet anti-imperialist arguments were also very appealing to Nationalist leaders. This was the period that became known as the First United Front. The Soviet Union sent Borodin (Mikhail Gruzenberg), a Comintern agent to China to advise the communists and the nationalists. He convinced the communists to join the Kuomintang yet maintain their own communist party membership. He introduced Leninist organizational techniques to the Kuomintang, including the principle of democratic centralism ( 民主集中制)(discussed in Chapter). Because China was so fragmented with warlordism nearly all the leaders agreed that reunification would have to be accomplished militarily. The focus of that effort was the Whampoa Military Academy which was established in 1924 by the Kuomintang, supported by the Soviet Union, and headed by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang had just returned from Moscow where he studied military organization. The most significant aspect of military organization introduced to China by Chiang and Soviet advisors at the school was the political commissar system, an organizational device and doctrine to ensure political reliability of military forces.18Sun and Chiang were convinced by Borodin to appoint Zhou Enlai, returned student from France who later became the Premier of the PRC, as the Director of the Political Department. From that position, Zhou was able to influence the thoughts of students and the appointment of communists to key positions throughout the KMT army. One of the first students, Lin Biao, later became the senior military officer in the communist People’s Liberation Army. The communists were successful at placing their followers into operational assignments in the KMT army units that later fought against the communists. Those individuals provided critical intelligence information to the communist forces during the civil war. The nationalists believe this subversion and infiltration of their forces through the political commissar system is one of the most important factors in their loss to the communists. On July 1, 1926 a joint nationalist-communist military force, headed by Chiang Kai-shek and his Whampoa students, began the Northern Expedition which was intended to begin the military and political consolidation and unification of China. Sun Yat-sen had died in 1925 and Chiang Kai- shek assumed leadership of the KMT. As the campaign began there were already schisms between communist and nationalist officers, based on ideological approaches, within the ranks of the army. During the campaign, differences in strategies emerged. The communists focused on urban (Nanchang and Canton) and rural (Changsha) uprisings while Chiang preferred to use the military forces.19Chiang met with Borodin and other officers on January 11, 1927 to explain his position. His ideas were rejected and he was publicly humiliated by Borodin and other leftist officers. The conflict between the two sides had turned personal. The ideological difference came to the fore in the spring of 1927 in Shanghai. Borodin and the leftist element of the KMT were busy organizing workers and peasants to rise up against the landlords and industrialists. On March 21, 1927 they organized a general strike by the huge General Labor Union in Shanghai that brought the city to a halt. Chiang, on the other hand, while initially supporting the labor uprising, ultimately sided with the business groups partially because they were a major source of financial support. He finally declared the labor unions to be illegal and turned his guns on them to restore order. In April he purged the KMT of communists that he knew of and that ended the first united front. The communists at that time concluded that Chiang Kai-shek had shown his true colors as a representative of the “national bourgeoisie” while they represented workers and peasants.20 During the next ten years the communists and nationalists continued their internecine warfare. In October of 1934 the nationalists gained the upper hand and surrounded the communists in their Jiangxi province bases by using unique military tactics of key strong points.21The communists were able to break out and flee nearly 6,000 miles on what became known as the “Long March” to the South, then West and finally North to Yan’an in Shaanxi province where they established their headquarters. Mao Zedong led the communist army through very rough terrain fighting all the way. He lost nearly 90 percent of his troops to hostile fire, disease and defection. Those 8,000 or 9,000 who completed the journey became heroes for the communist cause.22It was during this period when the KMT promulgated the first Martial Law the substance of which became the foundation for later martial law in Taiwan. In December of 1936 a strange incident occurred. One of Chiang Kai-shek’s warlord generals, Zhang Xueliang , kidnapped him in Xian and demanded that he end the civil war and begin to develop a national front against Japan.23Zhou Enlai was dispatched by the communists to negotiate Chiang’s release because Stalin, calling the shots from Moscow, believed Chiang was the only person capable of leading a national effort. Chiang was released and Zhang was arrested and kept under guard even after they relocated to Taiwan. Chiang became a hero and even though Zhou Enlai was instrumental in negotiating his release, it did not heal his personal animosity for the communists. At the same time the Japanese were advancing into China and saw this civil warfare as an opportunity. One unit near Beijing accidentally started a confrontation with nationalist troops on July 7, 1937, that led to open fighting (at the Marco Polo Bridge – 卢沟桥). It was the beginning of World War II in China. Chiang Kai-shek launched a major attack on the Japanese in August. He used his best and most loyal troops and nearly 60 percent of them (250,000) became casualties. 24This early commitment and loss of Chiang’s best troops is another of the major factors that the nationalists believe in retrospect caused their loss in the civil war. In September 1937, in the face of intense and successful Japanese attacks, the communists and nationalists decided to cooperate in a Second United Front. The communists promised “to work to realize Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People(三民主義) … to give up armed rebellion, the forming of soviets, and the confiscation of landlord’s holdings.”25The communists even agreed to place their army, the Eight Route Army under nationalist command. Even though they were working together they kept at arms length and neither side trusted the other . . . for good reason. The turning point was at the end of 1940 when the communist troops refused to follow orders and even attacked KMT troops on January 5, 1941 at Sanshi. The nationalist troops responded by ambushing communist New Fourth Army troops and killing 3,000 of them.26 The New Fourth Army incident was isolated and did not completely stop cooperation. Out of necessity they continued to work against the Japanese, but separately. Mao and the communists continued to consolidate and train their troops in guerrilla warfare tactics in Yan’an. Their efforts against the Japanese were reduced. The Nationalists believed they were shirking their duties by not exerting a maximum effort against the Japanese. They also believed the communists were merely preparing for a later showdown with nationalist forces. In 1944 and again in 1945, the Americans briefly tried to get the communists and nationalists to cooperate again, but to no avail. The rift was complete. As both sides rushed to reclaim land occupied by the Japanese they eventually came into conflict again and in November of 1945 Chiang attacked communist forces and a full-blown civil war was on. In addition to the deception and subversion that occurred between the communists and nationalists before and during the war with Japan, the history of this period reveals deep-seated ideological differences as well as the massive scope of civil war destructiveness. Nearly every citizen in every province in the country was affected to some extent. Both sides agreed on the final goal of reclaiming China from foreigners and establishing an effective government that could unify and govern all of China. The problem was how to accomplish those tasks and how China should be governed after unification and consolidation. China had gone through 24 feudal dynasties in a little over 2000 years. Each dynasty started with a unifier. The first dynasty emerged when Emperor Qin Shi Huang Di, the leader of one of the states (during the period known as the Warring States Period) eventually (221 B.C.) gained the upper hand and conquered all the other states to unify the country for the first time. That set the pattern to come. Just prior to each new dynasty the country was very weak and divided into independent kingdoms. Because of the instability and conflict there was great intellectual activity. Philosophers defined the problem and proposed solutions. One of the solutions was always a unified nation. Whether the new leaders came from within or in four cases from outside China{e.g. when China was conquered by barbarians or outsiders Northern Wei in (386-534 AD), the Liao Dynasty (907- 1127 AD), the Yuan Dynasty established by the Mongols (1279-1368 AD) and the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty (1644-1911 AD)} the pattern generally holds true. The Qing Dynasty that ended in 1911 was the last of the dynasties. Each new dynasty started strong and had lots of enthusiasm. Over two or three generations the rulers relaxed and became less efficient at governing the nation. The Army got comfortable with no enemy to fight and the bureaucracy got fat on the perquisites. The less efficient the government the more they had to expand the bureaucracy and raise taxes and squeeze the people. The nation became weaker and weaker. The more the people were squeezed, the more discontent. As the national center became weak, outer areas became strong enough to resist any influence from the Center. Usually toward the end of a dynasty some natural disaster occurred, like earthquakes or a change in the course of the Yellow River causing severe floods, and these were taken as a loss of the "Mandate of Heaven" (天命--articulated in the Chou Period before dynasties began). This lossof the mandate was a sign that the people were justified in overthrowing the government and starting a new cycle. All educated Chinese were conscious of the dynastic cycle phenomenon and that included Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Chiang Kai-shek. All agreed and included in their own writings the sacred goal of national unification. They did not agree on how to achieve it or what the country should look like after unification. The various positions appeared in their respective ideologies. The central issue in the Chinese Civil War was the role to be played by the first level of political and economic administrators. That included landlords and officials at the lowest levels such as the village or the district in cities. At the time it also included the warlords who maintained control over several regions. These were the people responsible for the daily management of the society. To oversimplify a little, generally Chiang Kai-shek believed he could co-opt and educate that group and cause them to follow his system of governance. Mao Zedong, on the other hand, believed this level of societal leadership had to be eliminated and replaced by different people; communists. Mao followed a ruthless line of “class-struggle” to kill or force into exile this whole class of people. There was little opportunity for a second chance. There were some who converted and became good communists and they were accepted, but kept under surveillance. This is not to say that Chiang Kai-shek was not ruthless, but the scope of those he eliminated was much less. His emphasis was on conversion. Mao’s involvement of all the people in his “people’s war” meant that everyone throughout the society would be touched. Whether workers in urban areas or peasants in the countryside, they were all organized and manipulated to struggle against the class of people who administered them. The revolution then was not accomplished by a small group of well armed rebels who gained control, it included the broad masses that were used to struggle against and eliminate all authority at the first level above them. Everyone got blood on their hands and had a stake in the outcome of the revolution. The most important consequence of the Communist victory for the Taiwan Strait issue was that the class of people who were eliminated, suffered severely. Many were killed and many were able to flee to Taiwan, Hong Kong or elsewhere. That meant that a large percentage of the refugees who made it to Taiwan, besides the poorly educated soldiers, were from that administrator class of mostly literate citizens. They were not just refugees; they were people who lost property or positions of responsibility. Nearly every one had a story of how family members were killed by the communists or how they had just escaped death to make it to Taiwan. They came from every part of China. It was not, like some civil wars, a situation in which the militaries clash and one side wins and then governs. The feelings of antipathy went far beyond the militaries of each side. One fortunate aspect of this story is that the managers who fled from China were educated and had sufficient experience to replace most of the Japanese administrators who returned to Japan after the War. On the other hand, because of their connections and experience they were placed in positions that many Taiwanese perhaps should have had, but Taiwanese were not trusted yet because of their relationship with the Japanese for the previous fifty years. The scope of the Chinese Civil War and the number of people involved in actual fighting was probably the largest in human history. It touched every province at all levels. In one campaign, the Xuzhou Campaign (徐州战役) (called Hwai Hai - 淮海戰役 - in Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek’s Waterloo by some), more than one million combatants met on the battlefield at one time. It was a major military defeat for the nationalists. They lost approximately 400,000 men, or fifty- six divisions (four of which defected to the Communist side), in this sixty-five-day campaign (from November 6, 1948 to January 10, 1949).27It has been estimated that somewhere between 1.8 to 3.5 millions Chinese died in the fighting during the four-year period.28 1945 – Present The beginning of the return to Chinese rule in Taiwan started out badly. The troops who arrived to garrison Taiwan were the dregs of the KMT army which was losing the civil war in China. Not only were they poor, slovenly, undisciplined, and not well-trained soldiers, they came to Taiwan with a strong hostile attitude against the Taiwanese. They came as conquerors not as liberators. They knew that nearly all Taiwanese were more Japanese than Chinese and that many had served in the army of their enemy for the past eight years. The Taiwanese were considered subversive right from the beginning and harsh control measures were considered appropriate. During the first year after the KMT took over administrative control of the island, everything possible was taken out of the Taiwanese economy to support the war effort in China. By the end of 1946, when the communists were gaining momentum, even most of the soldiers were returned to China to fight. Since the nearly 200,000 Japanese police and military that had maintained control over the population prior to the end of the war had departed for Japan, the island was left with very little law enforcement capability. As a result on February 28, 1947, a major riot erupted against the new Chinese authorities and after a few days it was put down ruthlessly. Thousands of Taiwanese leaders and potential leaders were identified and killed. In fact, this began a more than thirty-year interlude known as the “White Terror” ( 白色恐怖) period in which the Chinese Nationalist administration ruled with a very heavy hand. The “White Terror” period was characterized as one of severe repression. Any Taiwanese who publicly spoke out against Chiang Kai-shek or the Nationalist Government was immediately imprisoned or forced into exile. One of the mistakes made by the nationalist leadership was to label anyone who spoke out against the government as “communist.” Some of those identified, caught, and punished were not communists but were Taiwanese nationalists who were again advocating a separate identity for Taiwan. From a nationalist perspective though, anyone who did not completely support Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party were engaged in activity that worked against the government in its struggle against the communist threat. They were probably correct, but labeling all who disagreed as communist ultimately created sincere and dedicated Taiwan independence advocates.29From their perspective, they knew they were not communists and they could just not see how their activity might be indirectly supporting the Chinese communist cause. Once Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist army retreated to Taiwan in 1949 the situation changed. The KMT leadership, after a period of introspection, understood that if they were to prevail and ultimately return to the mainland to throw out the communists, they would need the loyalty and support of the Taiwanese. They had to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese people. After a short period of intense introspection they developed programs to establish solid political control over Taiwan, to develop a strong economic infrastructure, and to educate and sinicize the population. Not only did they have to reintroduce Chinese values and create a feeling of “chineseness,” but they had to create a loyalty to the nationalist party program and its leaders. In addition to the police and military control efforts that identified, caught and punished those who did not go along with the program, they also developed a number of relatively sophisticated positive education programs. They began by controlling all the mass media (newspapers, radio and later TV) and making sure that their message was the only message that got to the people. They immediately began a “mandarin” education campaign to try to get all Taiwanese to understand and speak one official language, mandarin, since the native Taiwanese dialects were completely different and not mutually intelligible. All popular entertainment programs on the radio and later on TV were only broadcast in mandarin. If a Taiwanese wanted entertainment he or she would have to learn mandarin. A second front for this effort was the schools. The language of instruction was again mandarin. The content was carefully controlled by the government to present the main themes; the glory of being Chinese and supporting the democratic program outlined by Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles. Textbooks were replete with teachings about these topics from the first grade on. At the high school and college levels, military instructors were included on the staff to make sure all instruction complied with government guidelines. A third important area of influence was the China Youth League which was sponsored by the Kuomintang. The youth league and its newspaper were controlled by the General Political Department of the nationalist army. It arranged all types of activities for young people such as camping and sports contests. Since the military controlled key camping areas and trucks to get there, if a student wanted to participate in fun activities the only option was to join the youth league activities. All of the activities included a major dose of political and cultural indoctrination. In addition to these indoctrination efforts, the nationalist government worked hard and was successful in developing effective economic programs for the island. It started with a major land reform program which was very popular with the farmers, especially those who acquired land of their own. Taiwan’s economic programs for the next four decades were extremely successful. A solid infrastructure of highways, electrified railroads, airfields, a mass transit system, water control projects, an efficient banking system and much more helped Taiwan to progress to the point that the effort became known as an “economic miracle.”30 By the 1980s Taiwan was regarded as a very successful country by many nations around the world and by the Taiwanese themselves. Nonetheless, there were still many who remembered the period of “White Terror” and believed that the average Taiwanese citizen did not have enough voice over political affairs. Part of this dissatisfaction manifested itself in a continued rift between the mainlanders who arrived in Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 and those who were living in Taiwan and emerged from the control of the Japanese. Chapter 2 describes how this rift played out. SUMMARY Chinese and Taiwanese history has been selectively used to promote both unification and Taiwan Independence. It is clear that Taiwan has been a part of China for centuries even though at times China did not exercise its control. It is also clear that throughout most of Taiwan’s history there has been a strong tendency toward independence from within. On two occasions, Koxinga in the 17th Century and Chiang Kai-shek in the 20th Century, the rebellion against the national center was more against the new Chinese rulers than a cry for independence. But throughout Taiwan’s history there have also been advocates of total independence from China. A relatively objective view of history will indicate that there are strong points to support either position, especially if the totality of the history is avoided. As a result history cannot be used as the sole justification for either position but selected historical incidents can be used to enhance the justification for unification or independence. There is also little doubt that history contributes significantly to the mindset of the leaders on both sides of the Strait. It will take decades before those who had personal experience in the conflict to pass from the scene and make it more of an academic issue than an emotional issue. Websites like the official PRC presentation of history and the one supported by Taiwan independence advocates are good examples of selective history and must be considered judiciously. Nearly any formal historical presentation that purports to prove that unification or Taiwanese independence is the appropriate path has to be incomplete and is often out of context. CULTURE Culture is another factor that has been used selectively to promote unification or independence.31Consider the following statement by advocates of Taiwan independence: The large majority of the people on the island (85 percent) do not consider themselves Chinese but Taiwanese. They have their own language, culture, and history, and are as distinct from the Chinese as the Americans are distinct from the British.32 Early advocates of Taiwan independence often made the case that Taiwan’s culture was not Chinese. The validity of this contention depends to a large degree on the definition of culture. The statement above cleverly compares the separation of China and Taiwan with the separation of England and America. The separation though in both cases is political not cultural. In recent years some leaders in Taiwan have worked very hard to establish a new and separate identity in Taiwan that will justify political separation. One very academic work that supports this effort is a book by Melissa Brown -'Is Taiwan Chinese?' The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities. She redefines "culture" and states that, "identity is based on social experience, not cultural ideas or ancestry." She uses this theoretical construct to make the claim that Taiwan may have a new and separate "national" identity. Her book is the most sophisticated statement of why Taiwan should be considered to have a separate identity and therefore perhaps merit independent status. There is an element of reality in the contention that a cultural distinction between China and Taiwan can be made. Self-perception may be important, but an objective look at cultural identity depends partially on whether the definition of culture is based on what has been called the “Great Tradition,” the “Lesser Tradition” or some form of modern amalgamated culture. The Great Tradition The Great Tradition Culture generally includes high culture; great musical, literary or art works: In China, Peking Opera; Russia, War and Peace by Dostoyevsky and Italy Michangelo's Mona Lisa. Lesser tradition culture, on the other hand, is the culture of the average citizen or peasant. The use of chopsticks and what type of food he/she eats, how religious rites affect everyday behavior, and how, for example, the average citizen views education. Before the 1895 takeover by Japan, Taiwan was part of the Chinese great tradition. Educated Taiwanese at that time looked to great Chinese historical, literary and philosophical works and Chinese art. Some cultural areas, such as Taiwanese opera reflected a regional influence since the language was identical to that of areas in Southern Fujian Province. During the Japanese period (1895-1945), educated Taiwanese were not allowed to study law or politics so most well-educated Taiwanese studied agriculture and medical sciences. Neither were they encouraged to study areas in the Japanese Great Tradition. As a result the Great Tradition Culture went into decline and didn’t return until the Chinese recovered Taiwan in 1945. Under Nationalist leadership the Great Tradition of China was again stressed in the education system and in the establishment of museums and in art of all types. The Lesser Tradition The Lesser Tradition was Chinese before, during and after the Japanese occupation. Religious rites were primarily Buddhist and Taoist. Thousands of temples existed, large and small, in cities and villages, where citizens could go to worship ancestors and various kinds of spirits. The most famous was the Goddess of the Sea, Matsu (Mazu). Matsu originated in the Putian area of Fujian Province. She is said to have been able to recite one complete gospel of Buddha, the Guan-yin Book. She was especially worshipped as a protecting saint for fishermen or coastal dwellers in heavy storms, but her legend even included the ability to heal sickness. There are about five or six hundred Matsu temples all over Taiwan and the third month of each lunar year is considered to be the “month of Matsu.” It is at that time that worshippers travel to the temples to pay their respects to her. Most, but not all, of the major festivals celebrated in Taiwan originated in China: the Lunar New Year, the Dragon Boat Festival, the Tomb Sweeping Holiday, and the Mid-autumn Festival. Some festivals, such as the “Good Brothers” (on the 16th of each lunar month) are native to Taiwan. This festival becomes a business owner’s key festival (called Wei Ya 尾牙) - on the 16th of December each year. The business owner thanks the gods and his employees for the blessings of the past year. It is a common sense good management festival. One of the cultural features that link Taiwan to China is tomb style. The elaborate turtleback tombs found in Taiwan originate in Fujian Province. As a result it is clear that the actual ceremonies or rites of ancestor worship or ancestor reverence focused on the tombs found in Taiwan were transferred from China. Even the food in Taiwan is similar to that of Xiamen, Zhangzhou or Quanzhou in Fujian Province. Sometimes poor families ate dried shredded-sweet potato instead of rice, especially in bad times like the 1940’s. Salty preserved vegetables like turnips (long ones) and cucumbers, salty preserved fishes and smashed crabs (small ones), salty concentrated and preserved bean- curd…and other cheap edible food were common during those days. The types of preservation or cooking all came from China originally and are commonly found in many of China’s poor areas. Even favorite dishes like a special fried oyster dish (蚵阿煎) and a rice noodle dish (阿給米粉) are common to this day to Taiwan and Fujian. Some of Taiwan’s cultural habits also reflect a Japanese influence, but not to the extent of those from Fujian. Examples of Japanese foods like miso soup and raw fish became popular in Taiwan. The Taiwanese even adopted the practice of removing shoes prior to entry into homes to maintain cleanliness. Many of the older homes in Taiwan are still of a Japanese wooden style with grass (tatami) floors and sliding paper walls. We can conclude that while native and Japanese cultural behavior patterns have crept into Taiwanese daily life, there is no doubt that the predominant culture is that of regional China, Fujian Province. Everything from language to food to religious rites originated in Fujian. The New Taiwanese Culture The one cultural argument that Taiwanese independence advocates might use, but so far have not, is that of an evolved non-traditional culture in Taiwan that is different from that of China. The impact of Americans living and doing business in Taiwan combined with the fact that a high percentage of Taiwanese attended college in the United States has been strong. American values and behavior patterns from blue jeans to pop music have been closer to those in Taiwan than to those in China. Nonetheless, most Taiwanese still maintain their local cultural habits and language to a high degree. The changing cultural differences between Taiwanese and Chinese youth were increasing rapidly before the opening up period in China in 1978. The Communist indoctrination in unique values during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had an especially severe impact especially on young people. That impact included a break in many traditional values as they coped to survive in a desperate period. In the meantime, the youth of Taiwan were in an open period with increasing prosperity, freedoms and material goods available. The thought processes, particularly in interpersonal relationships became quite different. One lady raised in Taiwan, educated in the U.S., and living in China in 1980, met with relatives there and at the conclusion of several visits asked: “If these people are Chinese, what am I?” Underneath modern behavior patterns, however, there remained a high degree of “chinesesness” on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Close family ties, Confucian ethics, Buddhist and Taoist rites and daily eating habits all prevailed through the time of differences. By the beginning of the 21st Century, the youth on both sides of the Strait began to adopt similar “modern” behavior patterns from clothing styles to pop music. It had become increasingly difficult to distinguish a Taiwanese youth from a modern Chinese youth in daily cultural behavior. SUMMARY Taiwan’s great tradition was Chinese in the early periods and under the Chinese Nationalists. It was reduced to almost nothing during the Japanese occupation. Basic daily culture, however, has remained that of the Chinese region of Fujian throughout its modern history. While it did absorb many western values it has remained essentially Chinese. The cultural factor argues strongly against any suggestion that there are any cultural differences sufficient to make the case that Taiwan is not Chinese. Of all the factors, different cultural identities between Chinese and Taiwanese, is the least persuasive as a factor to support Taiwan independence. GEOGRAPHY Figure 1-1 Map of Taiwan Area The geographic factor influences the cross strait issue in several ways. First, Taiwan is strategically located just 100 miles off the coast of China, 700 miles south of Japan, and 200 miles north of the Philippines. Second, Taiwan is centrally located in Asia and that provides economic advantages and disadvantages. It is an island that must trade to survive, has few natural resources and must depend on outside sources for critical economic inputs. On the other hand, it is at the center of economic communications routes being about equidistant from Hong Kong and Shanghai and half way between Japan and the Philippines. Third, the terrain on Taiwan is mostly rugged mountains and that provides great advantage to the defender in any military confrontation. Fourth, its physical size (240 miles long by a maximum of 98 miles wide or 13,884 square miles) and population (23 million) is miniscule when compared to China’s size (3,601,014 square miles) and population (1.3 billion).33Taiwan has a coastline of only 708 miles while China has 9,010 miles of coastline. While these disparities are known and obvious, it is useful to remind ourselves of them as we consider other aspects of geography. Physical Geography Geologists and geographers note that based on the curvature of the mountain chain, Taiwan’s physical arc is different from that of the Ryukyu Islands or the Philippines.34Its structure appears to have broken from the continent rather than being part of the island chain. The relatively shallow (20 to 50 fathoms) Taiwan Strait further indicates that the area of the strait was once a low alluvial plain and that Taiwan was once an extension of what is now the Fujian coast. From a purely physical geographical perspective then, a strong case can be made that Taiwan is a part of China. Taiwan is a sub-tropical island similar in latitude to Cuba. It has a monsoon climate that brings plenty of moisture into most areas.35It occasionally has typhoons that cause severe damage. It only snows on the tops of the mountains. It is hot and humid in the summer and cool (35 to 50 degrees Fahrenheit) in the winter. The area with which we are concerned is the main island of Taiwan, two small islands just yards off the coast of China (Jinmen and Mazu), and the Penghu Islands.36The population of Taiwan is about 23 million, mostly located on the western plain. Its primary economy is information technology, but it also has a solid agricultural base (e.g., rice, bananas, tea). It has some coal and natural gas, but must import oil to maintain industrial output (e.g., steel, cement, plastics). It has three nuclear power plants to complement its hydropower (10 dams). The transportation, such as urban mass transit, highway, shipping, rail, and air, and communications systems on Taiwan are well developed but congested because of high population density. Because of the scarcity of flat land in Taiwan, military bases are generally co- located or within population centers. Its industry, power facilities and dams are all vulnerable to attack. As a result, any attack by an external enemy will cause severe damage and casualties. Precise targeting to avoid collateral damage will be very difficult. China has almost all types of weather from sub-tropical to near arctic and all types of terrain from some of the world’s tallest mountains to some of the most arid deserts. During the 1950s and 1960s China expended a great deal of human effort diversifying its industry and placing key factories in isolated areas and in caves or underground shelters. By the 1980s, when many of those factories were determined to be too remote to be cost effective, they were returned to more concentrated industrial areas. Nonetheless, there is still a high degree of industrial decentralization to the point that China’s productive infrastructure is too broad and to o diverse to offer decisive military targets. China also has the plans, people and facilities to quickly return to hardened areas such as bunkers or caves, if it were deemed necessary. While an attack by Taiwan could cause severe damage, it would not be crippling. It would take a major nuclear attack from a superpower like the United States to render China’s industry impotent. One possible exception is the Three Gorges Dam, which could be vulnerable to attack and, if the reservoir were full when attacked, the consequences would be severe in several provinces. Economic Location China takes up most of the Asian land mass and is relatively close, by air, to Central Europe, Russia, the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. The old adage that China believed itself to be the “Center of the World” is not so far off in economic trade terms. Nearly two-thirds of the world’s population (economic consumers) is within about 2,500 miles or 5 hours flying time from some part of China. That translates into a huge advantage in economic terms as world trade becomes more interdependent. China’s industrial Northeast has an especially advantageous location with respect to Russian Siberia, which contains many natural resources (e.g., minerals and natural gas) that are yet to be exploited. China is physically closer to Siberia than is the heartland of Russia. Further, China has the manpower willing and able to develop these areas. Already there are large numbers of overseas Chinese living in the Russian Far East. Russia has focused on a relationship with China since the beginning of the 20th Century. At that time they built a railroad to Dalian (e.g., Port Arthur) because it was the closest warm water port. Siberia’s key port city, Vladivostok, freezes over in the winter. Japan and Korea have also been interested in cooperating to exploit the Russian Far East. China has the potential to play a key global role in economic activity between all of those regions and Asia. Taiwan’s geographic location makes it a perfect transshipment point for Asia. Its airports and seaports are modern and have efficient equipment. Once the cross strait problem is resolved it will be a perfect location to consolidate goods destined for the Western Hemisphere or goods exported to Asia from the Western Hemisphere. While direct shipment for many goods will still be the principal shipment mode, for many goods that must be shipped in smaller quantities (e.g., one container load versus a whole shipload of goods) it will be more cost effective to ship through Taiwan. China and Taiwan both have the potential to benefit greatly in a future world of peaceful trade. The most important advantage will be the synergistic effect that will occur as the two begin to work together in the world community of nations in the future. Generally, China has natural resources and manpower and Taiwan has capital, technology and management expertise. Together they will become a powerful force, to the advantage of each of them, as they compete with America, the European Union, Japan and Russia in the global marketplace. Strategic Location Taiwan has long been considered a geo-strategic asset. It has often been called an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” It is within easy striking distance of China and most of its military facilities have been hardened over the last 50 years. Airplane hangers and key military installations, or alternate installations, have been hidden underground or deep in mountain caves. Even the islands of Jinmen and Mazu have been so heavily fortified that China, even with a preponderance of power has not been able to successfully invade them. Jinmen is especially impressive. It includes huge granite mountain caves that have protected the majority of Taiwan's army for those fifty years. Caves are so large that bulky supply boats can be driven clear inside the mountain. Even the military headquarters and hospital are within the mountain. One point on the location of Jinmen and Mazu is that it might be possible to successfully invade and occupy them, but in the past it has been deemed politically not feasible. The leaders of both China and Taiwan have generally agreed that separating the islands from Taiwan would de-link them from Taiwan and reduce the appearance of Taiwan’s belonging to China. They are symbolic of the connection between the two sides. Both sides treat them as counties. US pressures to return the islands to China to reduce frictions between the two sides were rejected for this reason. Geographic Size While Taiwan, among world countries, only ranks number 128 in size (it is larger than 63 countries), it has proven that economically size isn’t everything. It has become the 14 th largest trading nation in the world. It has a sophisticated banking system, a highly educated work force and is a leader in the most modern information technology sector. While its industry and population are crammed into a small space, it has developed efficient transportation and communication networks that make it economically competitive in the modern world. Getting goods from factory to ship or airplane is extremely efficient. While its population is only 23 million or 47 th in the world, that is still larger than many better-known countries of the world including Australia, Austria, Syria, Holland, Portugal, Greece, Sweden or Switzerland. China, on the other hand, is the fourth largest country in the world by area and the largest by population.37It is also well-endowed with natural resources, though energy is still a problem. The principal characteristic of its size is that it requires more effort in the area of transportation and communications to make it economically efficient. On the other hand, it is so spread out it is not so vulnerable to military attack. Even American military leaders have concluded that it would not be possible to invade and conquer China. America’s superiority in weapons systems would allow it to defeat the Chinese military easily in isolated battles outside the Asia continent, but not inside China’s borders. The fact that Taiwan is an economically rich, densely populated area has serious military implications. Militarily, the island remains significantly vulnerable. If we assume the worst, that weapons of mass destruction might be considered in a military conflict, we can see that vulnerability. Any military considering a total destruction attack on Taiwan would need very few weapons; for example, as few as four or five nuclear weapons could completely destroy the population and industry. While it would be possible to defend the island from complete occupation, it could not be defended from complete destruction. To counter this balance, Taiwan would have to build several hundred nuclear weapons and a new generation of missiles to do an equivalent amount of damage in China. It would be cost prohibitive and such a counterattack is also not likely to be totally successful. The lessons of history in which a victory could be had by defeating the enemy’s military forces are no longer valid. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. The disparity in size between China and Taiwan is incalculable. Whether measured in physical size or comprehensive military strength, China is to Goliath as Taiwan is to David. It is a mismatch of the first order and that means that if events lead to a final military showdown at some point, the clear advantage goes to China. When we consider military strategies, however, in Chapter Four we will see that the issue is not so clear-cut. SUMMARY The physical geographic factor enhances the position of those who argue that Taiwan is part of China. The geography of Taiwan highlights two key points: (1) it is an economically important entity in today’s world and (2) it is militarily vulnerable. The economically strategic location of Taiwan suggests it has a great potential for the future, especially when the region is peaceful and stable. It is likely to become even more prosperous and important as it increases cooperation with China. The economic prospects of Taiwan, Hong Kong and China all working closely together will make them even more competitive than they are now. They will be able to compete more effectively with the United States, th e European Union and Japan. Instability and military conflict, however, will seriously reduce that potential. We will consider the economic relationship and the steps that have already been taken between China and Taiwan in Chapter Three. The military factor is still the most likely factor to upset all progress in the region. The geographic characteristics suggest that Taiwan is extremely vulnerable especially in today’s world of advanced military strategies. On the other hand, the defense of Taiwan by a technologically superior nation like the United States, is feasible. The open sea between the two areas is an exposed battleground unlike the jungles of Vietnam or the mountains of Afghanistan. As we shall see in Chapter Four, China and Taiwan both understand how to take advantage of Taiwan’s geo-strategic location and characteristics. Taiwan’s proximity to China’s most prosperous coastal regions suggests a need for extreme caution on the part of both sides to prevent an unprecedented disaster in the region. THE LAW Four aspects of law have a profound impact on the cross strait relationship: judicial system compatibility, China’s laws regulating contact, Taiwan’s laws regulating contact and international law. The first is the most important in the long run as part of the cross strait negotiations process for defining the ultimate relationship. The two that regulate contact between Chinese and Taiwanese citizens are especially important in the period leading to final agreement because they help to create an environment for settling the differences peacefully. This set of laws includes regulations on travel, trade, investment, and even how citizens of the other side are treated. The role of international law is primarily to determine the right of statehood since one of the main issues is that some Taiwan leaders advocate independence under the international legal concept of self- determination. Judicial System Compatibility Although China has promised to allow Taiwan to maintain an independent judiciary in the future, the degree of legal system compatibility is still important. It is particularly critical in creating certainty in the relationship. When China becomes a nation under rule of law, as opposed to rule by man or a single political party, certainty and confidence will be enhanced. Taiwan's citizen's will have to be assured that whatever agreement is reached will endure and cannot easily be changed by whim of the Communist party leaders who have a record of reversing policies and agreements. More about the rule of law in a democracy will be discussed in the next chapter. Court system Taiwan has yet to develop a totally independent judiciary and China is even worse. Both sides are emerging from a period when the court system was regarded as an instrument of the ruling party and was strictly controlled by party mechanisms. Scholarly books about Taiwan's movement to democracy fail to discuss the role of the judiciary or court system as a balancer in a checks and balances system.38It is possible to conclude that Taiwan has not yet addressed this problem successfully. Taiwan's leaders are still concerned about judicial reform as is indicated, for example, in its official government publication, The Republic of China Yearbook - 2000. While strict party control of the judiciary and court system has been essentially eliminated, a structural or organizational guarantee of long-term independence has not yet been accomplished. China's judiciary is still under the near absolute control of the Chinese Communist Party. In both places, while there is serious reform occurring on the writing of laws and the administration or enforcement of the laws, neither have answered the larger question of how the judiciary fits into the total political system. Traditional Chinese culture is likely to influence the development and role of law in both Taiwan and China. Laws evolve and will reflect citizen values beyond a strict interpretation of the Constitution. In both areas the laws are likely to have a collective more than an individual bias for reasons discussed in the next chapter. There will be fundamental differences from Western underlying philosophies about the role of the courts in society. For example; the future Chinese judicial system is likely to continue to stress mediation and reaching settlements out of court more than judgments by judicial personnel. This is reflected in Taiwan's approach to criminal law.39When a citizen goes before a judge in Taiwan, he/she does not necessarily have the presumption of innocence. The judge spends more time on asking the question "why was the crime committed?" In the West the question is "was the crime committed?" In Taiwan, the judge's task is not so much to match the crime with a codified level of punishment (e.g., ten years for armed robbery), it is to determine whether the accused can be redeemed through reeducation or whether a punishment must be meted out. The same approach is generally true in China. In a U.S. court the principal question is whether the accused committed the crime and if he/she did, a near automatic punishment is meted out -- punishment to fit the crime. One indication of this approach to the role of law is in the early source of lawyers for China. Initially hundreds of new lawyers, and many who became judges, came from demobilized political commissars in the People's Liberation Army. They were selected not only to assist in military reductions, but because they were experts on mediation. They were not trained in the law, but they were effective go-betweens. The degree to which this approach to law will extend to or influence the role of law or legal institutions in society is open to question. What is clear though is that the ultimate function of law in China and Taiwan is likely to be similar to each other, but different from that in the West. These differences are likely to have a strong impact on the development of the judiciary as a part of a political checks and balances system. Constitution compatibility One aspect of the current Cross Strait issue is the legal consideration of how the constitutions of the two entities can converge after some form of unification. Most of the arguments supporting a Taiwan rewrite of its 1947 Republic of China Constitution have been written about in detail. It is clear that the 1947 constitution does not reflect the reality of today's political situation in Taiwan. Some (Pan-Blue) would revise the current constitution and others (Pan Green) would rewrite it. The primary point of disagreement is whether the new constitution would lead toward or have the appearance of leading toward independence. But there is another consideration that has not been discussed. That is how the constitution would be rewritten if the direction were toward unification. If Taiwan's direction were unification its constitution would still have to be changed significantly, probably rewritten. But before that can happen in Taiwan, China would have to rewrite its 1982 Constitution. In unification, under Beijing's current vision, Taiwan would become a subordinate political unit or Special Administrative Region similar to Hong Kong under a formula of "one country two systems." That means there would have to be some mention of the relationship between the constitutions similar to the relationship between an American State's constitution and the US Constitution. For example, in Article 3, Section 1 of the California Constitution there is the following statement: The State of California is an inseparable part of the United States of America, and the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Taiwan could not include such a statement in its constitution under any condition until the PRC Constitution is changed significantly. Taiwan's leaders accurately note that China is not yet a nation of law so any agreement resulting from future negotiations could not be depended upon. This idea is reinforced by the current controversy over the Basic Law in Hong Kong where China appears to be interfering in Hong Kong's election process despite an earlier negotiated agreement. Taiwan's leaders say that even if they negotiated an agreement with China, China could not be trusted to carry it out. Beyond the question of trusting China to carry out an agreement, there is the question of the relationship between the two constitutions. At least four parts of the current Chinese Constitution cannot be accepted by Taiwan's citizens: the preamble and articles 1, 3 and 35. China's preamble to its constitution is unlike preambles in other countries. For comparison, the preamble to the United States Constitution is a simple and concise forward-looking statement that outlines the national purpose. We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. In Germany the preamble is also very general and aims at the broader purposes of national unity and securing the peace: Conscious of their responsibility before God and men, moved by the purpose to serve world peace as an equal part in a unified Europe, the German People have adopted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Constitution. The Germans in the States [Länder] of Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North Rhine- Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig- Holstein and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self- determination. This Constitution is thus valid for the entire German People. Even Russia's preamble to its constitution only outlines the national purpose and basic underlying principles of the Constitution. It too is generally forward-looking. We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, united by a common destiny on our land, asserting human rights and liberties, civil peace and accord, preserving the historic unity of the state, proceeding from the commonly recognized principles of equality and self-determination of the peoples honoring the memory of our ancestors, who have passed on to us love of and respect for our homeland and faith in good and justice, reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting its immutable democratic foundations, striving to secure the wellbeing and prosperity of Russia and proceeding from a sense of responsibility for our homeland before the present and future generations, and being aware of ourselves as part of the world community, hereby approve the Constitution of the Russian Federation. France's preamble to its constitution also summarizes principles that form the basis for its constitution. The French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sovereignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and complemented by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946. By virtue of these principles and that of the self-determination of peoples, the Republic offers to the overseas territories that express the will to adhere to them new institutions founded on the common ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity and conceived with a view to their democratic development. The United Kingdom does not even have a single document that serves as a constitution. China's constitutional preamble is a comparatively long backward-looking, propagandistic statement that rationalizes the monopolistic role of the communist party, justifies the Marxist- Leninist Mao ideology, locks China into a socialist economic system and compels its citizens to comply with it. It does not, like the preambles to most national constitutions, focus on the welfare and protections of the citizens. On the contrary, it states that "Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road. . ." This statement was even included in the 1993 amendments. The strongest statement about promoting the welfare of the people is: "The state will do its utmost to promote the common prosperity of all the nationalities." The preamble includes more concern about its foreign policy and supporting "the oppressed nations and the developing countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national independence and develop national economies" than it does about freedoms for its own citizens. Finally, the PRC constitution's preamble outlines the citizen's responsibility to follow the laws prepared under the leadership of the Communist party rather than discuss any type of inalienable rights or freedoms. It says: The people of all nationalities, all state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and institutions in the country must take the Constitution as the basic standard of conduct, and they have the duty to uphold the dignity of the Constitution and ensure its implementation. Three additional sections in the PRC Constitution are problematic for Taiwan's citizens. The first is the principle of Democratic Centralism. Article one states that "The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants." When that statement is combined with Article 3 - "The state organs of the People's Republic of China apply the principle of democratic centralism" - the notion that the Chinese Constitution is democratic as is claimed by China becomes highly suspect to Taiwan observers. Democratic Centralism, a Leninist organizational concept, negates democratic principles. Taiwan's citizens understand this very well since their political system before 1987 under the Kuomintang also followed this Leninist principle. Although much of China's constitution sounds very democratic, the organizational principle (democratic centralism) that allows for nominations from above for all key government officials, and requires total obedience to the Communist Party, cancels out the democratic statements in the rest of the constitution. Further, the fact that Chinese leaders routinely ignore many of the articles in the constitution reinforces to Taiwan's citizens that China cannot be trusted to honor any future negotiated agreement. Taiwan's citizens are skeptical about a future negotiated agreement with China after examining the differences between statements in the constitution and political behavior in practice. For example, in Article 35 it states - "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration." Taiwan's citizens see China's treatment of dissenters who want to demonstrate or speak out against the current regime (Falun Gong or those who wish to commemorate Tiananmen) and see that even though there are other articles that provide exceptions to this article to justify their actions, they see the Chinese government as basically not following its own constitutional law. If it does not follow the law with respect to its own citizens, they state, how could they be trusted to comply with a future negotiated agreement with Taiwan? In this case, Taiwan would not want to change the words of the Chinese constitution, but it would want to see strict Chinese compliance with it. The central question then is how can Taiwan enter into negotiations with China and ultimately subordinate its sovereignty to such a constitution. Not only can Taiwan's citizen's not subscribe to the PRC Constitution, it cannot trust the single party in power to adhere to any future negotiated agreement. Taiwan has from the beginning of its dialogue with China insisted that no accommodation can be reached until China becomes more democratic. Two concrete measures of "China becoming more democratic" will have to include changes in its constitution that more clearly articulate the national purpose, rather than justify the monopolistic role of the Communist Party. Secondly, it will have to eliminate the propagandistic rhetoric as well as the complete removal of the principle of democratic centralism that contradicts the basic definition and principles of democracy. Only then can Taiwan rewrite its constitution and include some statement that allows for the Chinese constitution to be the supreme law of the land -- national sovereignty of one China. The question of trust can only occur after several years of observing how China complies with its own constitution. Law is an area in which Taiwan and China will be able to find agreement, but it will take time to develop. Both areas will require a major evolution in legal development; China more than Taiwan. It will take from twenty to thirty years for the legal systems to become relatively compatible and provide confidence that any agreement on the ultimate relationship between China and Taiwan will endure. China’s Laws Regulating Contact The first opening for legal contact between Taiwan and China came on October 16, 1987 when the PRC State Council promulgated the “Measures Governing Taiwan Compatriots' Family Visits and Trips to the Mainland.” This was followed on October 24, 1987 when the PRC Ministry of Public Security, Bureau of Exit and Entry, published a draft of "Six-article Measures Governing the Entry and Exit of Taiwan Compatriots."40These first two documents were the beginning of work to make cross strait travel legal and lay a foundation for later encouragement of travel between the two sides. The most important step in legalization of cross strait contacts occurred on July 3, 1988 in China with a State Council regulation designed to encourage investment from Taiwan to China. It was entitled “Regulations of the State Council of the People's Republic of China for Encouraging Taiwan Compatriots to Invest in the Mainland.” These regulations gave preferential treatment to Taiwanese investors by providing “tax holidays, duty-free imports, land use rights, transfer and inheritance of properties, permission to purchase bonds, and special areas designated exclusively for Taiwanese investments.”41The first three sets of regulations evolved into a consolidated law promulgated by Decree No. 93 of the State Council of the People's Republic of China on December 17, 1991, and effective as of May 1, 1992. It was called "Measures for the Control of Chinese Citizens Traveling to or from the Region of Taiwan." This document took advantage of the experience gained in the years after 1987 when travel, investment and trade began. It is a fairly comprehensive document that covers nearly any situation in which people from Taiwan enter China from marriage to funerals. It explains which travel or residence documents are required and what the penalties are for not following the rules. This formalization of cross strait contact proved to be extremely successful economically as will be described in Chapter 3. On March 5, 1994 the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress increased the coverage on investment from Taiwan by passing another more detailed law entitled “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Taiwan Compatriots’ Investment”. One of the most progressive laws to be passed was the law on recognizing Taiwan’s courts on May 26, 1998. Taiwan’s Laws Regulating Contact The year 1987 was also a watershed year in Taiwan and can be considered a major turning point in cross strait relations. Just four years before, Deng Xiaoping had introduced the notion of “one-country, two-systems.” It was a Chinese effort to move closer to some form of unification. Taiwan’s President Lee Denghui responded by repeating the “Three Noes” (三不政策) policy (no contacts, no negotiations, no compromise).42It appeared at that time as if there were absolutely no room for any movement in cross strait relations. Taiwan was unyielding. The first Taiwan laws to affect the cross strait relationship included the abolishment of two previous laws and the promulgation of a new security law. Martial Law and the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of the Communist Rebellion were both revoked in 1987. Not only did the revocation of these laws prepare Taiwan for movement toward a full democracy, the action also opened the way for cross strait contact by removing the stigma that any contact with the Mainland was subversive. The new National Security Law of Taiwan was promulgated on June 23, 1987 to define which contacts with the Mainland were legal and which were not. The spate of new laws and regulations that followed required a constitutional revision. Article 11 of the additional articles stated: "Rights and obligations between the people of the Chinese mainland area and those of the free area, and the disposition of other related affairs may be specified by law." Actually Taiwan began to change its attitude toward the Mainland as early as 1982 when it began to address Beijing as "the Chinese Communist Authorities" ( 中國當局 ) instead of "Communist bandits" (共匪) in all official publications. It also allowed more flexibility when it allowed Taiwan athletes to participate in the 1984 Olympics under the name of "Chinese Taipei" rather than the Republic of China. The government began to relax restrictions on trade, investment and travel in 1987 and made it easier to import mainland goods in 1989. New rules for direct investment and technical cooperation were promulgated in 1990. All of these changes combined with the change in the formal basis for cross strait relations from ideology and the "Three Noes" to a new foundation of economy and trade in 1995.43 The principal new law for cross strait contact was the "Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area" published on July 31, 1992. This is a very detailed statute that contains 92 articles and clearly shows the complexity of the relationship. This was followed by a detailed set of regulations published by the Ministry of Economics on April 26, 1993 entitled: "Regulations Governing Permission of Trade between Taiwan Area and Mainland Area." Combined these two documents provide a fairly comprehensive set of guidelines for relations across the Strait. International Law International Law is defined as an evolving set of rules and procedures which provide guidance for the interaction of nation-states, regions and/or international organizations.44It is sometimes described as "a body of rules which -- according to the usual definition -- regulate the conduct of the states in their intercourse with one another."45One of the classics on International Law states: "the Law of Nations, or International Law, may be defined as the body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized states in their relations with one another."46While national law is developed through a legislative process based on a constitution by a specialized political organization (legislature), international law is developed primarily through custom and treaties.47The legitimacy and enforcement of international law is enhanced by organizations like the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. Most international law should be considered, at this point, more as guidelines or standards for civilized behavior than codified rules that must be obeyed out of fear of punishment because of the lack of an international enforcement mechanism. One of the functions of international law is to define the criteria under which a political entity is eligible for statehood. For our purposes this area of international law is critical. The question is whether or not Taiwan can make the case that it deserves separate statehood based upon self- determination. As the nation-state emerged on the international stage, what were the criteria for establishing such a political entity? The world has been through and continues to grapple with the problem of trying to identify the criteria for defining statehood. Should the definition be based on common culture, language or values? Should it be based on geographical or topographical features? Should it be based on some form of historical circumstance or legal treaty? Or should it be based on economic or political systems? Perhaps there should be minimum or maximum population or geographic size. All of these criteria have at one time or another been the basis for men to commit violence to redefine the boundaries of a specific country. Europe led the way in the transition from philosophies of universalism to those of a sovereign states system. While ideas that contribute to statehood had been discussed for generations they didn't begin to crystallize and become meaningful until the period of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). This was an extremely important period in history because it caused Europeans to search for a more appropriate level of political organization. At the beginning of the war (1618) Germany for example had a population of 21 million and was divided into no less than 2,000 interdependent states.48It was a very loose coalition of those states. At the end of the Thirty Years War the Treaties of Westphalia were concluded and those treaties solidified the notion of sovereignty, but it still did not solidify the concept of sovereign nation-states. It did create étatism which allowed rulers to justify or rationalize actions in terms of state interests as opposed to universal or religious norms. While international law is still evolving it is clear that it does not support the breakup of existing states. In fact, quite the opposite, "one of the objectives of international law is to maintain the territorial integrity of states, which implies that governments of a state must be allowed to resist secession of a part of its territory using lawful means."49 Scholars focused on the breakup of the British Empire have concluded that "outside the colonial context the principle in international law of self-determination does not legitimize declarations of independence by territories within a state."50Since both China and Taiwan have historically claimed the whole of China as the "state," neither can find support in international law for unilateral separation. Sovereignty Sovereignty is one of the concepts that is still being consolidated in international law. It is currently considered more of a result or consequence of statehood than a criterion for statehood.51There are two interconnected concepts of sovereignty; internal and external. The first has to do with the authority of a government to make final decisions within its own state; decisions which only affect the citizens within that state. External sovereignty, on the other hand, refers to the ability of a state to relate to other states in the international arena without the interference of external authority. The notion of self-determination is another area of international law which is still developing. The right to self-determination originally developed as part of the anti-colonial movement. It usually focused on areas which were geographically removed from the colonial power, had a separate and distinct language and culture and in most cases came under the domination of the colonial power through force. Self-determination has now become an important factor in nations with particularly diverse populations like Russia and Yugoslavia. Even in those areas there are strong counter trends. The concern for the control of the military and nuclear weapons provides some pressures for a political unit larger than individual states if those states are small. Economic imperatives also push nations to cooperative behavior beyond a homogeneous nation-state. Cultural and political imperatives, on the other hand, tend toward independent nation-states. This is one area of which the UN Charter encourages violence. It supports the right to self- determination without carefully defining the term.52As a result there are many situations which may not have been what the framers of the UN Charter intended to be included in the notion of self-determination, but are sufficiently close to allow the people desiring a separate existence from a state to use the principle of self-determination as a rationale for cessation. Taiwan is an example. Territorial Integrity Another major element of state identity is closely related to the first. It is territorial integrity. The determination of the exact territory of a state is important and it is usually defined as land within geographical borders and over which a state has sovereignty or over which a state has absolute authority or controls the legal order.53It is not necessary that the territory be contiguous or follows natural boundaries.54 While sovereignty is the basis for territorial integrity and the two concepts overlap to a degree, the latter is a valuable notion because it is usually more visible and more permanent. Violations of territorial integrity are usually black and white activities. Either one state crosses the border of another state or it doesn't.55 A cross-border violation is now considered one of the most serious of offenses in the international system and it immediately invokes the right to self-defense; the only legitimate rationale for a just war. Violations of sovereignty are not always so clear and it is more difficult to gain agreement on what action should be taken to remedy the situation. The physical separation of Taiwan from China makes the question of territorial integrity clear. The invasion of Kuwait in 1990 by Iraq is a good example. Nearly every country in the UN joined in the condemnation of Iraq because the violation of Kuwait's territorial integrity was clear. The offense was considered so serious that most nations agreed it was justified to use force to reverse the aggression. While prior to 1990 the practicalities of the Cold War often prevented aggressors, the new post-Cold War period makes agreement on an issue like violation of a state's territorial integrity much easier than before and much more likely to be reversed by the international community. As a result China would have to make the political case that Taiwan is not a separate entity. Internal self-identification Early legal philosophers concluded that "the formation of a new state... is a matter of fact, and not of law."56The implication of this statement is that there is more to becoming a nation- state than just fulfilling the requirements of international law. This first stage of national self- identification is critical to the process. A group of people must come together and define themselves as a separate and distinct political entity. In the case of Taiwan there is not, as of yet, a consensus that Taiwan should be sovereign, although it is a major plank in the platform of the Democratic Progressive Party. External Acceptance Obviously no group of people can just come together, write a constitution and elect some leaders then declare (declaration) themselves a state. There are additional criteria for statehood, but at this point the criteria are imposed from outside. A potentially new state must be recognized as such by other nation-states or an international organization (recognition). International law provides much discussion and some criteria for determining whether a political entity is eligible to be considered a nation-state in the international system. Generally there are five accepted criteria:57 1. effective government 2. independence 3. defined territory under control with other states 4. permanent population 5. capacity to enter into relaitons It is important to note that these criteria are guidelines and some subjective judgment will still be required to determine whether or not a political entity should be considered a state. Effective government or governmental legitimacy is perhaps the most important of the five criteria. The problem of course is to define effectiveness and that requires a judgment. Two aspects must be considered: "the actual exercise of authority, and the right or title to exercise that authority."58The most difficult cases are those where there are different claims to the right or title to exercise authority, particularly when there are competing claims, and those are the cases that pose a threat to the peace. Independence is another decisive criterion. Demonstrated independence versus a future right to continued independence has to be taken into account. But the two principal considerations for use in the determination of statehood are: "the separate existence of an entity within reasonably coherent frontiers; and the fact the entity is 'not subject to the authority of any other State or group of States', which is to say, that it has over it 'no other authority than that of international law.'"59 Neither the size nor the fact that the defined territory is in dispute is considered sufficient to reject a claim to statehood. The territorial requirement is only necessary to support the main criteria; government and independence.60As with territory, the size of the population is not considered critical to the determination. It is sufficient to have a population that is subject to the rules of the government. Since nationality is conferred by the state and not vice versa the question of citizenship or nationality is a separate and distinct legal question. The fifth criteria, capacity to enter into relations with other states, is of lesser importance. It does, however, provide another measure to apply to determine the potential of a new state to enter the world community of nations. The real question is who is to decide on the status of statehood; the state itself through a unilateral declaration of independence, other states through recognition or an international organization like the United Nations. It seems logical to conclude that if a newly declared nation-state wants to be a member of the international community of nations, and that is certainly to the advantage of any state, then recognition must be a component. If the reasons for being a nation-state are to gain the rights, duties or protections of international law or access to international forums, then the recognition should probably be by the organization which best represents the community of nation-states; the United Nations. The United Nations is more appropriate for determining status than recognition from individual states or groups of states because it has the potential to avoid the problems associated with ideological conflict better. If legal status could be conveyed by a single state, for example, the US could recognize Tibet as a separate state to promote the US cause of democratizing the world. Such recognition could exacerbate the threat to the peace which is not in accord with the best interests of the world community. In other words, there needs to be a check on the ability to recognize new states and the United Nations has procedures in their normal voting schemes to do that. But if the United Nations is to be the principal organization for judging the qualifications of a potential new state it will need some relatively objective criteria. The five criteria mentioned above are a starting point and can be used now. They will, however, probably have to be evolved as other aspects of international law mature. All territory is now under the control of some state and that state can reject or accept the claim of a group for a new state. There are 191 member states in the United Nations, 16 territories that are registered as non self-governing territories (e.g., Guam, Gibralter, Falkland Islands)61and only one recognized state that is not members of the UN; the Vatican or Holy See. Taiwan doesn't fit any of these categories. Taiwan could theoretically claim legitimacy as a new sovereign state using one of three possible approaches: a change in regime, secession, or release by China. Legitimacy is important when there are conflicting claims and the international community has to choose between them. Since the United Nations and other states will have a decisive influence on whether Taiwan can be considered a separate sovereign state, and since China has veto power over membership in the United Nations, the practical reality is that Taiwan will not be able to achieve sovereignty under the current procedures of international law. SUMMARY China and Taiwan began to create a legal framework for cross strait relations in 1987. Many laws have been passed in each area and many more are still required. The entire process on both sides indicates seriousness about managing all activity in cross strait relations. The fact that both sides are passing laws about cross strait contact provides a foundation and environment for the ultimate resolution of the issue. Further, legal development in both Taiwan and China is likely to draw upon classical Chinese philosophies which will emphasize mediation over confrontation. International law is most confusing. While it appears that Taiwan, while not a colonial state, fulfills all the international legal requirements to be considered a separate state under the concept of self-determination. When the process is considered in total, the law cannot be a determining factor in whether Taiwan will or should be independent of or unified with China. China has the ability to veto proposals for membership in the United Nations or place pressure on other states in the global economic arena that can cause those states to refuse to recognize Taiwan as a separate state and that recognition is crucial to the success of independence. The law factor in our analysis is split. The philosophical basis for legal development and the actual evolution of domestic laws in both areas tends to support the unification effort by creating a better environment for contact between the two sides. International law, in theory tends to support those who advocate independence, but in reality it supports unification because of the current international system and its processes. CONCLUSIONS This chapter has examined some of the available information about three factors (history, culture, geography) that have persistent but passive influence on cross strait relations. The review of history and geography suggests that there is more evidence to support the argument that Taiwan is a part of China. If examined solely by itself, the culture factor would seem to point towards Taiwanese culture originating from the Chinese mainland. On the other hand, if culture is defined in modern sociological terms, a case can be made that over time, because of unique historical events, that Taiwan has developed its own eclectic modern culture that is quite different from that of China. Yet, it is also clear that as we move into the future a new convergence is occurring. The young people of China are becoming increasingly like the young people of Taiwan. Twenty years from now, partially because of the common historical culture and partially because of new exposure to a new world culture, the values and behavior patterns of the youths on both sides will be the same. While these three factors contain some ideas that add to the arguments of those who advocate unification and some ideas that contribute to the position of those who advocate Taiwan independence, none are active imperatives that cause movement toward a cross strait settlement. They will serve to enhance the debate, but will not stimulate movement. Actual movement toward a settlement will occur as a result of the other three factors that will be considered in this book: political, economic, and security. The law factor, on the other hand, is an active one that works to create an environment in which movement toward some form of unification can be made. International law suggests that Taiwan has a fairly strong case for independence based on the concept of self-determination, but in practical terms the real world processes of the current international system will not support independence. China will continue to be able to prevent such recognition in the UN and by other nations through economic and political pressures. 1 ‘Taiwan’s 400 Years of History’. New Taiwan: The Website for Taiwan’s History, Present, and Future. Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-1624.htm. (accessed 28 July 2015) This website is a presentation of the view of those who work toward Taiwan Independence 2 Chiao-min Hsieh, Taiwan – Ilha Formosa: A Geography in Perspective (Washington: Butterworths, 1964), pp. 125-127. 3 Ibid. p. 127. 4 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Organizations in Switzerland. Available at: http://www.china-­‐un.ch/eng/ (accessed 28 July 2015). 5 George H. Kerr, Formosa, Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement: 1895 – 1945 (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974), p. 5. The term Formosa is the Portuguese name for the Island and was used extensively until after the end of World War II. 6 Ibid., p. 5. 7 Taiwan’s 400 Years of History’. New Taiwan: The Website for Taiwan’s History, Present, and Future. Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-1624.htm. (accessed 28 July 2015) This website is a presentation of the view of those who work toward Taiwan Independence 8 Kerr, op.cit., Chapter 1. Also see: Hsieh, op.cit.., pp . 123-161 and J. W. Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present (London: Macmillan, 1933). 9 Taiwan’s 400 Years of History’. New Taiwan: The Website for Taiwan’s History, Present, and Future. Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-1624.htm. (accessed 28 July 2015) This website is a presentation of the view of those who work toward Taiwan Independence 10 For a description of this period see Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), Chapter 9. 11 Taiwan’s 400 Years of History’. New Taiwan: The Website for Taiwan’s History, Present, and Future. Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/hst-1624.htm. (accessed 28 July 2015) This website is a presentation of the view of those who work toward Taiwan Independence 12 For a more detailed description of the war see Spence, op. cit., pp. 222-224. 13 Ibid. p. 223. 14 Hsieh, op.cit., pp. 162-163. 15 The best English language source for this period is Kerr, op. cit 16 Ibid., Chapter 8. 17 For a more detailed description of this period see Spence, op. cit., Part III. 18 Monte R. Bullard, China’s Political-Military Evolution: The Party and the Military in the PRC, 1960-1984 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 72-73. 19 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up at Seventy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), pp. 42-56. 20 Spence, op. cit., p. 354. 21 William Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-1971 (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 268-280. Also see: Thomas A. Marks, Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 27-33. 22 Spence, op. cit., p. 409. 23 Ibid., pp. 421-424. 24 Ibid., p. 447. 25 Ibid., p. 460. Sun's Three Principles of the People were a loose equivalent of "of the people, by the people, and for the people" or "people's democracy, people's livelihood and people's sovereignty." These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 26 Ibid., p. 465. Also see: Chiang, op. cit., pp. 94-95. 27 Whitson, op. cit., pp. 174-186. 28 Valentino, Benjamin A. Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. Cornell University Press. December 8, 2005. p.88.29 For an early academic work promoting Taiwan Independence see: Lung-Chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell, Formosa, China, and the United Nations (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967). 30 Thomas Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,1986). 31 Common Misperceptions About Taiwan: A Reality Check for the Newsmedia. Available at: http://www.taiwandc.org/nws- ch04.htm (accessed 28 July 2015). 32 Ibid. 33 China. CIA World Factbook. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/attachments/summaries/CH-summary.pdf (accessed on 28 July 2015). 34 See Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 7-8 which provides a detailed explanation of the evolution of Taiwan’sgeology. 35 Average annual rainfall is 98.5 inches. Ibid., p. 48. 36 Jinmen is also known as Kinmen or Quemoy, Mazu as Matsu and the Penghu Islands as the Pescadores. Taiwan also controls two islands off the southeast coast, Lü Dao (Green Island) and Lan Yu (Orchid Island). There are a total of 77 islands under Taiwan’s political control. See: Ibid. pp.3-6. 37China follows Russia, Canada and the United States in size. It is close in size to the US. 38 This includes books by Hungmao Tien, Shirley Rigger, John Copper, Linda Chao and Ramon Myers, Tunjen Cheng and Stephan Haggard or Bruce Dickson. Even the book entitled Constitutional Reform and the Future of the Republic of China completely ignores the role of an independent judiciary in a checks and balances system. 39 This discussion comes from personal experience and anecdotes from Chinese friends. This topic requiresa great deal more serious academic research. 40 This information comes from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council website. Inquiries in China resulted in no knowledge of the regulations and indeed the claim that they never existed. Available at: https://www.taiwan.gov.tw/content_3.php (accessed 28 July 2015). 41 Yu-shan Wu, “Economic Reform, Cross-Straits Relations, and the Politics of Issue Linkage,” in Tun-jen Cheng, Chi Huang, and Samuel S.G. Wu (eds.), Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1995), p. 118. 42 The "Three No’s" policy was first announced in 1982 by President Chiang Chingkuo in response to China's Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Ye Chienying, who, in an interview with a Xinhua correspondent on September 30, 1981, elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of China's peaceful reunification. The elaboration became known as the "Nine Points for Taiwan's Return to the Motherland and Peaceful Reunification (Appendix 37). Proposals in one of the "Nine Points" became known as the "Three Links (commercial, postal, and travel) and Four Exchanges (academic, cultural, economic and athletic)." See: Suisheng Zhao (Ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 22. 43 Ibid. pp. 22-23. 44A clear example of the dynamics of international law can be seen in the preface to Hans Kelson, Principlesof International Law, 2d edition (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966). 45 Ibid. p. 3. 46 James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 1. 47 Robert E. Riggs, "The United Nations and the Politics of Law," in Lawrence S. Finkelstein (ed.), Politics in the United Nations System (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 41-43. 48 Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages, 3d Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p.263 49 Jo Eric Murkins with Peter Jones and Michael Keating, Scottish Independence: A Practical Guide (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2002), p.12. 50 Ibid. p. 39. 51 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 71. 52 Self-determination is mentioned twice in the UN Charter (Articles 1 and 55). See: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-i/index.html and http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-ix/index.html(accessed on 28 July 2015). 53 Kelson, op. cit., p. 307. 54 Ibid. 55 The history of divided nations in conflict may provide a case study of exceptions to this statement because the questions of statehood borders were not completely answered. Generally, however, states today are well-defined as states and most potential border problems areregistered.   56 L.F.L. Oppenheim, International Law, London: 1905, quoted in James Crawford, op. cit., p. 3. 57 Ibid., pp. 36-52. 58 Ibid. p. 44. 59 Ibid., p. 52. 60 Ibid., p. 40. 61 Non-self-governing territories listed by the UN General Assembly in 2003 included: American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Gibraltar, Guam, Montserrat, New Caledonia, Pitcairn, St. Helena, Tokelau, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands and Western Sahara.

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