Based upon EAPASI research, a consensus on the interpretation of the concept of 'One China' was reached in 1992 between the Kuomintang-led government (KMT) and China. During a meeting that took place in Hong Kong between the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATs) and the ROC’s Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), each side verbally agreed that the concept of 'One China' means 'one China with different interpretations' (一个中国各自表述). The agreement allowed the KMT-led government and China to put aside their differences over the exact definition of 'One China', in particular the underlying issues of sovereignty and territory as well as political legitimacy and recognition, and to move forward with cross-strait negotiations directed at building ties between the two sides. In 1993, Wang Daohan of the ARATS and C.F. Koo of the SEF met in Singapore to institutionalize the negotiations. The consensus reached in 1992 represented the understanding between China and specifically the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Kuomintang (KMT) that they held different interpretations of "One China" but were willing to negotiate the future of China-Taiwan relations within that specific context. Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was not part of this negotiated settlement.
Following the 1992 agreement, however, relations between the two sides deteriorated due to a series of incidents. The events included the Qiandao Lake Incident (1994); President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell (1995) where he gave a commencement speech and mentioned the Republic of China 17 times; the PLA military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait area (1995); and the PLA missile tests (1996) to prevent a referendum on independence from appearing on the ballot during Taiwan’s first presidential election (1996). Furthermore, in 1999 then Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui (KMT) stated that cross-strait ties are a “special state-to-state relationship” (the Two States Theory), signaling a policy shift away from the consensus reached by KMT and the CPC in 1992 that acknowledged there was “One China”. The CPC viewed Lee’s statement as a violation of that consensus and, as a result, canceled the second meeting between Koo and Wang. In 2000, the CPC released a White Paper on “The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”. The Paper reiterated the CPC’s adherence to the concept of “One China” especially the “One China Principle” which it outlined in great detail. The cross-strait relationship was in a deadlock. This stalemate prompted the former MAC Minister Su Chi of Taiwan to suggest that the two sides use the term “1992 Consensus” to ‘break the deadlock and alleviate tensions’. Su Chi made the proposal in 2000. From 2000 to 2008, the DPP – the major opposition party to the KMT – held political power. Notably in 2000 prior to taking political power, the DPP recognized the consensus reached in 1992, which, at the time, included the then President Chen Shui-bian and former MAC Minister Tsai Ing-wen (now President Tsai). Once the DPP took office, however, it refused to acknowledge the agreement. Instead, the DPP promoted a policy similar to former KMT President Lee Teng-hui (the two state theory). In particular it advocated that the two sides represent “one country on each side”. In addition the DPP launched a bid to hold a referendum to join the United Nations. In response to the developments on Taiwan, which, appeared to be active movement toward Taiwanese independence, the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) voted to submit draft legislation on anti-secession with respect to Taiwan to the National People’s Congress (NPC). In 2005, the NPC passed the anti-secession law. The Law reiterated that the “One China Principle” is the basis of reunification, while underscoring that China wants to peacefully resolve issues with Taiwan but retains the right to use force against Taiwan. Both Taiwan and the US objected to the legislation for various reasons, including China’s assertion in domestic law that it has the right to use force against Taiwan. In 2008 tensions in the cross-strait relationship deteriorated even more. In March 2008, the people of Taiwan elected Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) to the Office of the President. Within four days of Ma’s election, former Chinese president Hu Jintao stated in a call to then U.S. President George W. Bush that China and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of the 1992 consensus. By June 2008 the SEF and ARATS resumed talks using the 1992 Consensus as the framework. Between 2008 and 2016, SEF and ARATS held 11 rounds of high-level talks. The talks led to the signing of 23 agreements, as well as the issuance of two consensuses and three common opinions. The two sides also signed numerous Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). Although the '1992 Consensus' was a verbal agreement (and the phrase was created at a later date by former MAC Minister Su), it served as the framework for cross-strait negotiations and resulted in unprecedented cross-strait economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges. In January 2016 the people of Taiwan elected the DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-Wen to the Office of the President. As the former minister of MAC, Tsai Ing-wen had previously acknowledged the “1992 Consensus”. But during the former president Chen Shui-bian’s tenure in office (2000 to 2008), the DPP refused to acknowledge the '1992 Consensus'. In her Victory Speech and in her Inaugural Address, President Tsai recognized the historical fact of and the attendant outcomes of the 1992 meeting between SEF and ARATS. To date, however, the President has not verbalized the specific term “1992 Consensus”. This development, combined with a few other developments, has triggered the emergence of a cold pause in cross-strait relations. The fundamental issue confronting the PRC and Taiwan's DPP-led government is a clash over sovereignty, which is what the deadlock over the "1992 Consensus" represents. |
Implications for the Cross-Strait Relationship
The Tsai administration’s repudiation of the "1992 Consensus" has triggered strong reactions from the PRC because it represents a rejection of the concept of 'one China' and in particular the PRC's "One China Principle". The PRC continues to issue strongly worded statements that encourage Taiwan's leaders to say the phrase “1992 Consensus”. The PRC is pursuing policies that constrain Taiwan's diplomatic and international activities, as well as policies that circumvent the Tsai administration yet foster cross-strait ties with Taiwanese businesspeople and society. In addition, the PRC is using the three warfares and extra-military instruments to persuade Taiwan and the international community to reject the Tsai administration’s "dynamic" status quo policy which aims to maintain political separation (Taiwanese independence) from the PRC indefinitely. Instead of moving closer to the PRC's position, the Tsai administration recently has suggested that Taiwan "stop fixating" on the "1992 Consensus" and frame cross-strait ties using relevant laws. The refusal of the Tsai administration to verbalize the phrase means it rejects the "One China Principle", that is, it refuses to acknowledge the PRC's sovereignty claims over Taiwan and political legitimacy. The PRC and Taiwan are at loggerheads over the "1992 Consensus", which, if neither side yields, could produce increased hostilities in the Taiwan Strait. In particular, if the Tsai administration continues to refuse to say the phrase "1992 Consensus", it could prompt the PRC to invoke the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which has the potential to trigger a conflict that drags the U.S. in.
|
People's Republic of China (PRC)The 1992 Consensus embodies the one-China principle and defines the fundamental nature of cross-Straits relations; it thus holds the key to the peaceful development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. Recognize the historical fact of the 1992 Consensus and that the two sides both belong to one China, and then our two sides can conduct dialogue to address through discussion the concerns of the people of both sides, and no political party or group in Taiwan will have any difficulty conducting exchanges with the mainland. |
We must uphold the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, promote the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations, deepen economic cooperation and cultural exchange between the two sides of the Straits, and encourage fellow Chinese on both sides to oppose all separatist activities and work together to realize Chinese national rejuvenation President Xi Jinping Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China October 18, 2017 |
Yang Shangkun Administration
|
At this working-level consultation in Hong Kong, SEF representatives suggested that each side use respective verbal announcements to state the one China principle. On November 3rd, SEF sent a letter to ARATS, formally notifying that "each side will make respective statements through verbal announcements." ARATS fully respects and accepts SEF's suggestion.
- People's Daily, PRC, November 6, 1992 |
Ma Ying-jeou Administration (2008-2016)2016
2015
2013 - 2014
2011 - 2012
|
In our interpretation, the 1992 consensus does not involve two Chinas, one China and one Taiwan, or Taiwan independence.
Former President Ma Ying-jeou "Ma: Taiwan to solidify '1992 consensus' to pursue cross-strait peace" Focus Taiwan News Channel November 2015 |
Chen Shui-bian Administration
|
Lee Teng-hui Administration
|
Peking has agreed to a Taipei proposal that both sides "orally state" their respective "one China" principle in the process of joining efforts to pursue national unification, they have different understandings about the substance of "one China.
- Central News Agency, Taiwan, November 18, 1992 |
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)
BLOG POSTS
|